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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on public good provision.
The first chapter develops a model of charitys choice of fundraising method under
two dimensions of asymmetric information, quality and purpose. The main implica-
tion is a separating equilibrium where higher-quality charities choose to distinguish
themselves by using a traditional fundraising method, while lower-quality ones exploit
a low-stakes, take-it- or leave-it, “checkout method. An empirical application rein-
forced that charities of lower quality are more likely to adopt the checkout method.
Despite this, consumers still choose to give in the equilibrium, due to the small
requested amount of checkout donations, which disincentivizes serious thinking. Al-
though exploited by lower-quality charities, the checkout method, along with purpose
uncertainty, has the potential to alleviate the free-riding problem associated with
public good provision and is, therefore, welfare improving.
The second chapter studies why corporations donate to charities and how their
donations affect social welfare. I propose that firms make donations out of an image
reason. In a model where two firms compete with each other, charitable donation
could attract consumers and also signal firm overall social responsibility. I show that
there exists an equilibrium where the high responsibility firm overdonates, resulting
in a donation level closer to the socially optimal one. This leads to higher con-
sumer welfare due to higher private good consumption as well as higher public good
consumption when overdonation is prominent. Overall social welfare is enhanced.
Empirical results support social image as an incentive for firms to donate.
The third chapter examines people’s marginal willingness to pay for a change in
local public good provision. We use a fixed effects hedonic model with MSA level
data to study the effect of crime on local housing price. We explore the 1990s crime
drop and use abortion data in 1970s and 1980s as an instrumental variable based on
i
Donohue and Levitt (2001). One result we find is that a decrease in murder of 100
cases per 10,000 people increases housing price by 70%. We further translate this
result into a value of a statistical case of homicide, which is around 0.4 million in
1999 dollars.
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Chapter 1
FUNDRAISING UNDER TWO-DIMENSIONAL ASYMMETRIC
INFORMATION: THE CASE OF CHECKOUT DONATIONS
1.1 Introduction
Charitable organizations exhibit substantial heterogeneity in many aspects, and
the economic activity of charitable donation involves information asymmetry. One
source of information asymmetry is the quality of charitable organizations. Even
though the vast majority of charitable organizations are sincere in their efforts to
support public purposes, the quality of charities could vary. For example, if a charity
spends a large proportion of the funds raised on throwing expensive galas or other
activities that do not directly contribute to the actual charitable programs of the
charity, then the charity might not be considered as an efficient, or high-quality one.
This level of efficiency or quality is not immediately apparent to a would-be donor,
and requires time and effort to verify.
Another source of heterogeneity comes from the purpose of charities. Charities
plead for numerous different causes. Some major purpose categories include educa-
tion, environment, health, etc., and can be further divided into finer subcategories.
Some charities have names that are fully aligned with their purpose, e.g., the Breast
Cancer Research Foundation. Others, however, do not fully reveal their purposes
through their names. For example, the charitable organization, Futures for Children,
is dedicated to help children, but only children with American Indian heritage, to
attain post-secondary education. Hence, for consumers encountering a charity for the
first time, there exists uncertainty over the exact purpose of the charity. Previous
1
literature has mainly focused on the quality dimension of asymmetric information. I
argue that the purpose dimension is also important, because consumers might have
different preferences for specific purposes. What is more, purpose is not the only
aspect of charities that consumers have heterogeneous tastes for. For example, a
charity with a primary goal of supporting women’s education might support abortion
as well, and a charity that mainly provides food to children might try to teach chil-
dren religion at the same time. These are characteristics that are not immediately or
costlessly verifiable, and consumers could potentially hold strong and different views
about them.
In this paper, I study charitable fundraising under the two aforementioned dimen-
sions of asymmetric information. Quality is unknown to consumers, but consumers
homogeneously prefer charities with higher quality. The second dimension, which I
call “purpose and others”, encompasses any unobservable characteristics over which
consumers have heterogeneous preferences. The second dimension is important for
public good analysis, as public good provision suffers the underprovision problem due
to free-riding among consumers, and a mismatch between “purpose and others” and
a consumer’s taste might provide the consumer with additional incentive to free-ride.
When information is asymmetric, consumers are unable to make fully-informed
decisions. Yet, consumers are also sophisticated, in the sense that they are able and
sometimes willing to do some research to learn about a charity’s type before making a
donation decision. For instance, by studying the tax return Form 990 or investigating
outside ratings, consumers could obtain a good sense of a charity’s quality. And by
reading the program details and news articles of a charity, consumers can uncover
the “purpose and others” of the charity. But in order to obtain the initially hidden
information, consumers need to devote some time or resources to the research, hence
search is costly. If they do decide to search, they would be able to make a serious
2
donation when the charity type matches their taste, and donate less or simply opt
out when the type is non-matching. However, since search is costly, there exists a
trade-off between avoiding the search cost and making a more informed decision.
This trade-off provides certain charities with the opportunity to exploit fundraising
strategies that discourage consumers to search. And the fundraising strategy that is
commonly referred to as “checkout donations” count as one of them.
As the name implies, checkout donations often occur at checkouts in supermarkets
and department stores, where the cashier would ask the consumer whether he would
like to donate a small amount of money to charity. Common questions include: “would
you like to donate a dollar to charity” or “would you like to round up your purchase
to the nearest dollar amount as a donation to charity?” Since the amount is so small,
and the take-it- or leave-it nature requires only a simple answer of “yes” or “no”, the
decision does not require much serious thinking: in expectation, the combined value
of the cause and quality either exceeds the value of the small donation, or it does
not. Moreover, also due to the small donation size, the cost of searching exceeds the
benefit of acquiring extra information. Hence, charities that do not want consumers
to find out about their types, might want to take advantage of the “mindlessness”
of consumers by using checkout donations. On the other hand, some other charities
might prefer to have consumers know about their type in order to make a more
serious, informed donation, and hence adopt more conventional fundraising methods
where they, for instance, send letters in the mail to ask for open-ended donations.
The conjecture is that the fundraising method a charity uses might serve as a signal
to consumers on its hidden quality type.
In order to study this signaling mechanism, I set up a game between a charity
with two-dimensional asymmetric information and consumers of heterogeneous taste
for “purpose and others.” The charity chooses a fundraising strategy between open-
3
ended and checkout, which can also serve as a signal for quality. Consumers, after
seeing the signal, play a simultaneous game where they decide to search or not and
then how much to donate taking into account their beliefs and tastes. By focusing
on a separating Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, I find that a charity of higher quality
tends to adopt the conventional open-ended fundraising strategy, while a charity of
lower quality utilizes the take-it- or leave-it checkout fundraising strategy. Hence,
the fundraising strategy a charity adopts functions as a signaling mechanism through
which quality is revealed. The next step I take is to seek empirical evidence to evaluate
the model. Using data obtained from both an email survey and Better Business
Bureau, I set up the testable hypothesis that charities with lower program percentage
levels exhibit higher tendency to adopt checkout donation methods. Logit and Probit
regression results indicate that, on average, one percentage point decrease in program
percentage is associated with approximately one percentage point increase in the
probability of using checkout donations. Hence, the empirical results are consistent
with the separating Bayesian Nash Equilibrium predictions.
If it is truly the case that only lower quality charities adopt the checkout strat-
egy and thereby separate themselves from others, then it might seem strange that
consumers, being aware of the separation, still choose to donate to these charities,
making checkout donation a common phenomenon. Although the model explains
that the expected value of donating exceeds that of searching or not donating, there
is still a fair question to raise regarding whether authority should step in and prohibit
checkout donations all in all, as a means to prevent bad charities from exploiting of
the “mindlessness” of consumers. To provide an answer to this question, I conduct
a counterfactual analysis in which the checkout method is banned. The welfare re-
sult shows that compared to this world without checkout donations, the separating
equilibrium in the baseline scenario actually exhibits higher ex-ante welfare. The
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reason behind this result does not involve costs of search, but rather concerns the
second dimension of asymmetric information, where consumers’ taste heterogeneity
comes into play. When facing a checkout donation request, consumers do not bother
to search or reject the small request, taking into account that the charity, although
not high-quality, has at least a high chance of matching their taste for “purpose and
others.” So checkout donation, together with purpose uncertainty, has the potential
to alleviate the free-riding problem that is characteristic of public goods. As a result,
checkout donation enhances social welfare by improving private provision of public
goods and, therefore, should not be banned.
One thing that should be acknowledged is the behavioral aspect of checkout do-
nations. The presence of observers undeniably affects consumers’ decision to donate.
However, in this paper I only study the other fundamental aspect of checkout dona-
tions, and that is the “mindless” aspect. Whether there are more observers present
or not, consumers are urged by the cashier, who evidently does not represent the
charity, to make a snap decision. This imposed time constraint alone could spur
skepticism on the credibility of the charity. Moreover, it is unlikely for the consumers
to thoroughly inquire into the detailed purpose or other hidden characteristics of the
charity under the time constraint. But my model suggests that exactly due to the
“mindless” nature of checkout donations, that is, the small donation size and purpose
obscurity, consumers reach the snap decision of donating to the charity, even if the
charity might not be a great one. On the other hand, the behavioral aspect, although
important, is not unique to checkout donations. For example, DellaVigna et al. (2012)
find through a field experiment of door-to-door fundraising that a class of consumers
avoid social pressure by “opting out” of the campaign if given the chance, or donate
small amounts to lesson the discomfort of social pressure when not given the chance
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to “opt out.” So one may expect that the observer effect at checkouts would also
induce this class of consumers to donate.
1.2 Related Literature
One problem that is characteristic of voluntary provision of public good is the
free-riding problem. The traditional model predicts that the total level of public
goods provided is below the socially optimal level, and government provision crowds
out private provision completely (Bergstrom et al., 1986, for example). However, as
noted in Andreoni (1988), household participation rate in voluntary giving is high,
and government grants only partially crowd out private donations. Andreoni further
shows that when assumptions in the traditional model are relaxed, then the traditional
model “fails to explain either the extensive or intensive nature of giving.”
There exists a strand of literature that gives attention to fundraising methods
and investigates how fundraising behavior may attract higher levels of giving than
the traditional model predicts. Andreoni (1998) studies the effect of “seed money”
on total funds raised and concludes that the existence of seed money could pull
the society out of the suboptimal zero-contribution equilibrium. Harbaugh (1998)
adds a “prestige” component to individual’s utility when analyzing how “brackets”
(e.g., silver, gold, platinum) works to improve public good provisions. Cornes and
Sandler (1984, 1994) study impure public goods and show that when private and
public outputs are jointly provided by one single good, free-riding is less of a problem,
as compared to pure public good models. Kotchen (2005) follows and extends this line
of research on impure public goods by focusing on environmentally friendly goods with
the existence of substitutes for both the public and private characteristics. Morgan
(2000) models fixed-prize raffles as a fundraising method that mitigates free-riding and
suggests that the negative externality of entering a fixed-prize lottery counteracts the
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positive externality from the public good and hence improves public good provision.
And numerous experimental studies shed light on various fundraising methods such
as rebates and matching grants (Eckel and Grossman, 2003; Karlan and List, 2007;
Huck et al., 2015), sequential giving (Potters et al., 2007; Bracha et al., 2011), gift
exchange (Falk, 2007; Eckel et al., 2016), etc. While the different fundraising methods
could induce giving, some of them could also increase the overhead cost, and hence
lower the perceived quality of a charity. Rose-Ackerman (1982) points out that donors
might not like charities with high overheads and models charitable fundraising under
asymmetric information. However, only more recently have studies focused on the
potential for donors to acquire hidden information on charity quality.
Vesterlund (2003) studies sequential fundraising where a charity has the option to
announce the initial contribution. In her model, there is a lead giver who moves first,
where he decides whether to purchase information on quality, and a second donor who
follows. The quality of the charity is either high or low. If it is low, then the donors
do not receive any utility from the public good built. The charity chooses whether
to announce or not to announce the initial contribution of the lead donor, and the
lead donor can then decide whether to purchase information on quality or not. If the
charity chooses to make the announcement, then the lead donor has the opportunity to
make a second donation, together with the second donor. If there is no announcement
of the initial contribution, then the two donors donate simultaneously. Vesterlund
focuses on perfect Bayesian equilibria where the charity chooses to announce initial
contributions. Under information cost that falls into a certain range, the lead giver
would purchase information when and only when announcement is made. Then a lead
giver who knows the charity is of higher quality would make a substantially larger
donation than if the quality is public information, in order to send a signal to the
second donor. Hence, in this particular equilibrium, the announcement strategy itself
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does not reveal the quality type of the charity, but since the lead donor chooses to
purchase information and overdonate, the quality type is revealed and the free-riding
problem is mitigated. Andreoni (2006) considers a similar setting where a lead giver
has the option to purchase information from the charity and donates an amount that
might signal the quality to the second-round givers. One difference is that a bad
charity could have either zero value to consumers or a low but positive value. And
the consequence is that there will be a wealthy, voluntary lead giver who gives an
exceptionally large initial gift to a good charity in order to convince the followers
that the quality is indeed high. Following the theoretical papers, Potters et al. (2007)
obtain experimental evidence supporting the theoretical predictions of leadership in
sequential giving.
This paper belongs to the pool of studies on fundraising methods. The model
shares some features in Vesterlund (2003) such as unknown quality of charity and
the ability to costly search for it. Yet, this paper also adds some new features to the
existing literature. First, it examines a distinct fundraising strategy, namely checkout
donations, which has not yet been formally studied. Second, it introduces an extra
dimension of asymmetric information, namely “purpose and others” of charities, on
top of unknown quality, and this purpose uncertainty assists the checkout fundraising
method in alleviating the free-riding problem. As for the unknown quality, the low
type does not offer zero utility as in previous literature, but rather a strictly positive
utility for the public good it builds. Another small distinction is that, unlike afore-
mentioned studies, the search ability is not restricted to any particular giver, thus
making all consumers “sophisticated” players of the game. Last but not the least,
the signaling mechanism is different. In Vesterlund (2003) and Andreoni (2006), the
lead donor has the opportunity to signal the charity’s quality by donating different
amounts. In this paper, I consider the possibility of the charity itself to directly sig-
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nal its quality to the consumers by using differentiating fundraising strategies. This
means that although the consumers could potentially search for quality, they do not
have to solely rely on the search mechanism to reveal the hidden information.
In addition to the theoretical studies mentioned above, there are a few experi-
mental studies that are close to the checkout fundraising method. Andreoni et al.
(forthcoming) set up a field experiment with the Salvation Army, which collects cash
donations at store entrances during the Christmas season. Although the charity does
not ask for take-it- or leave-it amounts, the donations collected are typically small,
and are, therefore, similar to checkout donations. The authors find in a set of ex-
periments that explicit verbal asking increases giving significantly. They also find
that consumers who are uncomfortable with refusing to give seek to avoid the explicit
asking but not the silent solicitation. These results do not undermine this paper’s
results, as checkout fundraising does not necessarily require any verbal asking. Since
the cashier does not work for the charity, it is very common for the cashier to skip the
verbal ask and simply let the consumer decide to donate a dollar or not on the check-
out screen. Moreover, checkout fundraising does not have to take place in physical
stores but could also work at online checkouts. This is another reason why this paper
focuses on the signaling aspect of checkout fundraising and not on the behavioral
aspect.
The experimental study by Charness and Cheung (2013) is more directly related
to the checkout fundraising method. The authors conduct a field experiment in a
restaurant, where they set up a donation jar at the cashier with a suggested donation
amount of $0.5, $1, or $2, or without a suggested amount. The result is that the
treatments with suggested amount of $0.5 and $1 yield significantly higher average
daily donations than the $2 and no suggestion cases. Although the experiment con-
siders suggested amounts instead of take-it- or leave-it amounts, it has a similar flavor
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to checkout donations. And the experiment results are compatible with my model’s
predictions, which will be discussed in a later section.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Preliminaries
Charities are heterogeneous in quality and “purpose and others.” To simplify
notation, I will use “purpose” to denote the second dimension. A charity can be
of two quality types, Q ∈ {high, low}. 1 The purpose of a charity can either be
Purpose A or Purpose B, i.e., P ∈ {A,B}. The joint distribution of the charity’s
type is uniform, and is common knowledge, but the realized type is privately known
by the charity. The charity’s strategy set includes: to ask for an open-ended donation
that is optimal for the consumer, and to ask for a take-it- or leave-it donation in a
small amount, i.e., less than a certain upper bound. I call the open-ended fundraising
method “open” and the take-it- or leave-it method “epsilon.” The upper bound
of epsilon is denoted as ε¯. It is natural to assume that ε¯ should be small, hence
“mindless.” This is because, in the real world, it is rare for a charity to ask for a
donation bigger than a dollar without offering the option to change the amount.
There are two consumers, A and B. Their utility takes the form:
Ui(xi, G) = xi + αilog(G) ,
where xi is Consumer i’s private good consumption, G is the total level of public
good or donations raised, that is, G =
∑
gi, and αi is Consumer i’s taste, or more
1The so-called “low” type is not necessarily a bad charity per se, it is just not as lean as the high
type. For example, CharityWatch, a nonprofit charity watchdog organization, considers a charity
to be efficient when its program percentage is 75% or higher (Charity Rating Guide and Watchdog
Report, Volume 62. December 2012. CharityWatch.). But a charity with a program percentage
lower than that cutoff is by no means a bad charity for sure. The public good such a charity builds
still benefits consumers, but consumers might judge them as a lower-quality charity, due to reports
from watchdog organizations such as CharityWatch.
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precisely, perceived value of the public good. This perceived value is determined by
both the quality and purpose of the charity that provides the public good. Both
consumers prefer a high-type charity to a low-type one, so αi is higher if the charity
has Q = high. But consumers value the two purposes differently. Consumer A cares
more about Purpose A, and consumer B finds Purpose B more important. And this
is commonly known. So αi is higher if the charity’s purpose is more aligned with
Consumer i’s interest. To be more specific, I let αi take the form:
αi =

1, Q = high, P = i
q, Q = low, P = i
p, Q = high, P 6= i
qp, Q = low, P 6= i
where P, i ∈ {A,B}, and q, p ∈ (0, 1). q being strictly larger than zero means that
even if the charity type is low, consumer still gains some, although possibly slender,
utility from the public good it builds. And p being strictly less than one indicates that
consumers feel strictly better after giving to one cause than the other, even though
they feel good about giving to either.
Consumer i chooses xi and gi to maximize utility subject to budget constraint
xi + gi = w .
Consumers can conduct some search to find out Q and P of the charity simultaneously
at a fixed cost, K > 0. The cost enters utility linearly, if search is undertaken. Before
donating to maximize their utility, consumers decide whether to search or not.
The structure of the game is the following. In the first stage, nature selects the
charity’s type to be one of highA, highB, lowA, lowB, with equal probability for
simplicity. Knowing its type, the charity chooses its fundraising strategy to be open
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or epsilon. If the charity chooses epsilon, it also decides a numerical amount, ε,
which does not exceed the upper bound, ε¯. After observing the fundraising strategy,
Consumer A and Consumer B update their prior belief about charity’s type and play
a simultaneous game. In the simultaneous game, A chooses to search or not search
and then gi to maximize expected utility, and B does the same thing at the same
time. The total level of public good, G, is simply the total donation from A and
B, i.e., gA + gB = G. Then each consumer’s total realized payoff is the utility from
private good consumption plus public good consumption adjusted by taste and minus
search cost as needed. And the charity’s payoff is the total level of G raised.
1.3.2 Main Result: A Separating Pure-Strategy BNE
Existence of the Equilibrium
The main focus is on a separating pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. The
equilibrium is separating in the sense that a high-type charity would adopt the open
fundraising method, while a low type chooses to use epsilon. Both consumers, when
facing the same information, choose the same action, either search or no search. The
separation feature makes the equilibrium particularly interesting. It indicates that
the fundraising strategy the charity adopts is no longer just means to raise proceeds,
but can also work as a signaling mechanism to inform the consumers about charity’s
hidden type.
The upper bound of the epsilon amount is set to be q, the taste parameter for a low
type, and remains the same throughout all equilibrium discussions. This assumption
should not be too restrictive, because q is also the optimal amount a purpose-matched
consumer would donate given he knows that he faces a low type and that the non-
matched consumer does not give.2 As argued earlier, checkout donations are supposed
2When a consumer is approached by a seemingly untrustworthy charity (or simply a person)
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to be small, since it is hard for a charity to ask for a take-it- or leave-it amount higher
than consumer’s willingness to give. Hence, an upper bound higher than q seems
to be unfair, while an upper bound moderately smaller than q would not affect the
equilibrium results.
Proposition 1. For any q small enough and p large enough, there exists an
interval of K that support a separating pure-strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, in
which:
(a) A high-type charity uses strategy open and a low type uses strategy epsilon
with ε = q+qp
2
log(2);
(b) When consumers observe open, both update their belief to “high for sure,”
and both search. Then the consumer who cares less about the purpose fully free-rides
on the one who cares more;
(c) When consumers observe epsilon, both update their belief to “low for sure,”
take on no search, and donate ε.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proof Intuition:
To prove such an equilibrium exists, I need to show that once the equilibrium is
reached, there is no deviation on both the consumers’ and the charity’s sides. First of
all, given the charity adopts open, and both consumers know consequently that the
charity is of type high, both consumers would want to search and find out about the
purpose and then optimize utility, provided the search cost K is small enough. On
the other hand, when the search cost K is large enough, given the charity asks for ε,
both consumers know that the quality is low, and hence they would rather just give
and asked for money, it seems generous enough to donate an amount assuming the charity is not a
good one and no one else is donating. And if the charity asks for a large take-it- or leave-it amount
that exceeds the consumer’s highest willingness to pay, and the consumer counter-offers a smaller
amount, such as q in this case, it is unlikely that the charity would decline.
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ε without knowing the true purpose, as the ε amount is too small to be worth the
trouble of finding the purpose out. On the charity’s side, when q is small enough, i.e.,
the difference between high and low types is significant, the high type would not want
to ask for epsilon donations, because it would be taken as a low type, hence the payoff
would be lower. And when p is large enough, i.e., the non-matching purpose still gives
the consumer high enough value from donating, then both consumers at the epsilon
side have high incentives to donate even though the quality is low. Consequently, for a
low type, it would not deviate to open and pretend to be high, because the consumers
would then search and know its true type, which would lead to lower payoff for the
low-type charity.
Figure 1.1 shows in the q − p space the region where the separating equilibrium
can be supported. The bottom region fails to support the equilibrium because the
consumers do not care enough for a public good that does not match their interest,
so they are less willing to contribute to checkout donations. As a result, low type
can no longer benefit much from utilizing the checkout strategy and might as well
deviate to the open-ended strategy. In the upper-right corner, where q is too large,
the difference between a high and a low charity is small. Then a high charity might
also want to use the checkout strategy, as it would not mind being regarded as a low
type and collecting non-trivial checkout donations from both consumers.
A Numerical Illustration
To provide a better sense of magnitude for the search cost, K, I calculate the interval
of K that supports the separating equilibrium for q = 0.2 and p = 0.8. The choice
of these numbers has no special meaning and is just for illustration purposes. When
consumers’ perceived values of certain types of public goods are set to be the above,
the search cost that supports the separating equilibrium ranges from 0.0069 to 0.165.
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Figure 1.1: Parameter Values Supporting the Separating Equilibrium
Notes: The figure shows in the q−p space the region (shaded) where the separating equilib-
rium in Proposition 1 can be supported. The horizontal axis, q, is the parameter reflecting
how much utility from public good consumption is discounted due to the lower quality of
the charity. The vertical axis, p, is the parameter reflecting how much utility from public
good consumption is discounted due to an unmatched purpose as compared to a matched
one.
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Any search cost within this range is not too big for the consumers to incur when
facing a high charity, and is also not too trivial for the consumers to “mindlessly”
donate the small take-it- or leave-it amount. Also, this range of search costs is well
below the donation given to a high charity by the consumer who cares more about
the purpose, which equals to 1.
1.3.3 Other Types of Equilibria
There exist various types of equilibria along with different off-path beliefs to sup-
port them. In this subsection, I briefly discuss the existence (or nonexistence) of other
types of equilibria. The first type to consider is the reverse separating equilibrium
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where a high type adopts an epsilon strategy, while the low type chooses open. It
turns out that this type of separation cannot be supported for any values of search
cost. Suppose such a separating equilibrium exists, where high adopts epsilon and
low chooses open. Then, consumers know it is a high type when seeing epsilon, and
low when seeing open. If both consumers search at epsilon and donate regardless of
purpose, then there would be profitable deviation to no search. Suppose the high
type asks for an epsilon amount that is the highest amount a consumer would give
without searching and given the other consumer gives, then its payoff must be larger
than the upper bound, q (as the low type receives payoff higher than q in the baseline
separating equilibrium). Since the low type cannot receive a payoff higher than q at
the open side, the low type would want to deviate to epsilon and pretend to be high,
as there is no search at epsilon. Suppose the high type asks for q, then one case is
that consumers do not search and both donate, then again, the low type would want
to deviate. The other case is that consumers search and only the purpose-matching
consumer donates. If consumers do not search at the open side, then the low type,
receiving less than q would again benefit from deviating to epsilon. If consumers do
search at the open side, then the high type would want to deviate to open to receive
the higher, optimal amount from the purpose-matching consumer. To sum up, there
is always profitable deviation on the charity’s side. Hence, a separating equilibrium
where high type chooses epsilon and low, open does not exist.
One way to “pool” is to choose open no matter what type the charity is. Such
equilibrium could exist if the search cost is so small that the consumers choose to
search even when facing a small epsilon request. However, assuming the same range
of search costs and parameter values that support the baseline equilibrium, it can be
shown that this type of pooling equilibrium does not exist. When seeing open, the
consumers would always search (see proof of Proposition 2). If consumers’ off-path
16
belief is that a type that deviates to epsilon is low, then they would choose no search
and donate ε, just as in the baseline separating equilibrium. If, on the other extreme,
the consumers’ off-path belief is that only a high type would deviate to epsilon, then
it is clear that consumers’ best responses is still to choose no search and donate ε.
Since consumers never search off-path, a low type would benefit from deviating to
epsilon, breaking the pooling equilibrium.
Another way to pool is for both types to choose epsilon with a same ε amount.
Such equilibrium could exist when search cost is so large that the charity could ask
for high epsilon amounts without the consumers searching, so even the high type is
better off at the epsilon side. This pooling can be broken when the search cost is not
that large. Even if search cost is large, when the epsilon amount asked is restricted
to be less than 1
2
, that is, half of the optimal amount consumer gives at the open end
in the main separating equilibrium, it would always be profitable for the high type
to deviate to open. And the low type would not deviate given consumers’ off-path
belief satisfies the Cho-Kreps criterion.
One more type of equilibrium that could be of potential interest is a semi-separating
equilibrium, where the high type chooses open, while the low type randomizes be-
tween open and epsilon. For this equilibrium to exist, the low type has to be asking
for an epsilon amount of q
2
, because otherwise the low type would not want to play
a mixed strategy. Given this condition is satisfied, the semi-separating equilibrium
can be supported by the range of search costs in the main separating equilibrium.
At the open side, consumers’ belief is in accordance with the Bayes’ rule, and they
would choose to search and find out the hidden information. At the epsilon side, they
believe it is a low type for sure, do not search, and donate the epsilon amount re-
quested. This semi-pooling equilibrium gives a separation result with a similar flavor
as in the baseline separating equilibrium, but a less stark one. In the next section, I
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compare welfare levels between the baseline separating case and a scenario where ep-
silon strategy does not exist. If instead of the fully separating equilibrium, I use this
semi-separating result as the baseline scenario, I can only obtain a weak comparison.
So instead, I focus on the fully separating case in the welfare discussion.
1.4 Welfare Discussions
1.4.1 A Question
The intuition behind the baseline separating equilibrium is straightforward. When
there is a signaling mechanism, the high-type charity would not risk being misjudged
as low quality by asking for small donations. Rather, it would want the consumers to
know about its quality and make a serious donation, even if that means losing entirely
the consumer who does not care much about its purpose. On the other hand, the
low quality charity would not want the consumers to make fully-informed decisions.
If the low type pretends to be a high type, then the consumers will search and find
out about both its true quality and purpose. Then, the consumer who does not
care about its purpose would opt out, while the consumer who cares more would not
donate much more than the epsilon amount since he knows the quality is low. Hence,
the gain on the intensive margin does not offset the loss on the extensive margin, and
the charity would rather adopt the checkout strategy to benefit from consumers not
knowing and not caring to know about its purpose.
This equilibrium result clearly implies that the low, and only the low quality
charities are taking advantage of the “mindlessness” of consumers. If this is the case,
then it might seem strange that consumers would still be willing to give, even when
these checkout charities are known to be the bad ones. The model provides a simple
answer to this question. When a charity asks for a small checkout donation, even
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though the consumers know that the charity is not highly efficient, they also do not
regard the public goods raised by this charity as negligible. So because the search
cost is non-trivial, when facing a small, take-it- or leave-it request, consumers do
not bother with the search, and simply donate the small amount in response to the
slightly positive value of a lower quality charity. Moreover, they understand that
there is a 50% chance that the charity’s purpose would match their interest, and
for the other 50%, even though the purpose does not match, the perceived value is
still high enough. As a result, consumers would rather donate the small amount than
privately consuming it simply because the charity might not be of the highest quality.
But even if consumers willingly let bad charities exploit checkout donations, one
might still wonder whether the authority should step in and ban the checkout donation
method all in all, because in this case, low-quality charities will lose this chance to
exploit the “mindlessness” of consumers. In the next subsection, I provide an answer
to this question by comparing the baseline separating equilibrium with a situation
where the checkout donation method is prohibited. It turns out that consumers are
better off when checkout donations exist.
1.4.2 Counterfactual Analysis
In this counterfactual analysis, I take the main separating equilibrium in Section 3
as the baseline scenario, and consider the alternative scenario where the charities are
not allowed to use the epsilon strategy. The range of search cost and the upper bound
of epsilon are set to be the same as in the baseline model for a fair comparison. If
epsilon is removed, and the only strategy the charity could use is open, then consumers
are no longer able to infer the quality without searching. And indeed, they will always
choose to search and find out the hidden information.
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Proposition 2. When there is only the open strategy, there is an equilibrium
where consumers always choose to search. And this equilibrium yields lower ex-ante
welfare than the separating equilibrium in the baseline model.
Proof: See Appendix.
The result of Proposition 2 grants merit to the usage of checkout donations. This
might not seem straightforward, because one might think that the consumers would
be better off if they always search to find out about all hidden types and then opti-
mize under full information. However, this is not the case. The baseline separating
equilibrium yields higher ex-ante welfare even though purpose is unclear at the ep-
silon side. The reason is two-fold and does not concern the search cost. (Consumers’
expected payoff from the baseline equilibrium outcome is already higher than the
expected payoff from the no-epsilon scenario even before considering the extra search
cost in the no-epsilon scenario.) First, the existence of the signaling mechanism in the
baseline equilibrium effortlessly reveals charity’s quality–one of the two dimensions
of asymmetric information. When a low type cannot pretend to be high and di-
lute the overall expected quality, inefficiency due to information asymmetry is largely
reduced. Secondly, and more importantly, the remaining dimension of asymmetric
information, namely the “purpose and others” of the charity, has the potential to al-
leviate the free-riding problem that is characteristic of public good provisions. When
a charity asks for a small donation, and purpose is still uncertain, the consumer who
cares less and would have otherwise chosen to free-ride, has now the incentive to
donate. This gain on the extensive margin increases overall public good provision.
Certainly, purpose obscurity alone might not improve public good provision. But it
works under the checkout donation method: Since the take-it- or leave-it request is
so small, consumers do not bother to search and consequently have less incentive to
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free-ride without having the exact information on purpose and other characteristics
they potentially care about.
If it were a normal consumption good that we are considering, this positive effect
of purpose uncertainty on welfare would not show. But for a public good, there
already exists welfare loss due to the positive externality from public good provision.
Purpose uncertainly induces consumers to make uninformed decisions when asked for
a checkout donation, but at the same time, it counteracts the positive externality by
hindering the consumers from free-riding. In other words, it enhances welfare of the
whole by hurting the individual in a Nash game. This logic is somewhat analogous
to the one in Morgan (2000) on fixed-prize raffles.
To sum up, when there is two-dimensional information asymmetry, an extra strat-
egy of checkout donations helps improve social welfare by clearing up the inefficient
dimension but also ameliorates the free-riding problem by keeping the other dimension
intact along with the incentive to donate. And when the checkout donation method
is actually welfare-enhancing, there is certainly no reason to prohibit its existence.
1.4.3 Connection to Charness and Cheung (2013)
Charness and Cheung (2013) set up a donation jar at a restaurant cashier and
conduct four treatments where either there is a suggested amount of $0.5, $1, or $2,
or no suggested amount. The average daily donation for the first two treatments are
$3.568 and $3.023, respectively, which are significantly higher than that of the last two
treatments, which are $1.581 and $1.506, respectively. The mechanism in Charness
and Cheung is different, in particular, they consider suggested amount instead of take-
it- or leave-it amount. But the magnitude is small, similar to checkout donations,
and it could be the case that the small suggested amount also serves as a signal to
consumers saying that the charity is of low quality. As a result, when seeing $0.5 or
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$1, consumers might think it is a lower quality charity, do not care to search, and
donate. When there is no suggested amount, however, consumers might engage in
search and find out that the charity is not so lean, hence only the consumers who
really care about the charity’s purpose donate. As for the case of a $2 suggested
amount, one possibility is that it exceeds the amount consumers are willing to donate
when expecting the charity to be bad. As a results, they might search and find out
about the true type, leading to a lower donation rate. Charness and Cheung did
not provide the participation rate under the four treatments. The average donations
from the first two treatments, which are roughly twice the magnitude of the last two
treatments, could have resulted from an increase on the intensive margin. But it could
also very well be due to a gain on the extensive margin, i.e., lesser free-riding. This is
why the results by Charness and Cheung might be explainable using the reasonings
of this paper and imply that fundraising strategies that have a similar flavor as the
checkout strategy might have a similar effect of alleviating the free-riding problem
and enhancing welfare.
1.5 Empirical Evidence
The main separating equilibrium provides theoretical basis for the following testable
hypothesis.
Hypothesis: A higher-quality charity, i.e., a charity that spends a higher percent-
age of total expenses on charitable programs, has less tendency to adopt a checkout
donation strategy.
In this section, I empirically test the above hypothesis using logit and probit
estimations.
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1.5.1 Data and Variables
The main data source I use is the website of BBB Wise Giving Alliance, a nonprofit
organization that helps donors make better-informed decisions. For over seven hun-
dred charities, BBB collects and reports important figures from their tax return Form
990 and evaluate charities according to BBB’s own standards. My key independent
variable of interest and additional control variables come from BBB’s database.
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that indicates whether a charity uses
a small-size donation strategy. I collected the data for this variable through an email
survey of the charities listed on the BBB website. The main question asked is: “Does
your organization raise funds through collaborating with grocery/department stores
at checkouts or through other special methods to collect donations in small amounts,
e.g., around $1?” I do not restrict to donations occurring at store checkouts because
I want to focus on small-size donations with checkouts being a typical example. This
way, I also obtain more affirmative observations. One problem is that only a fraction
of the surveyed charities actually responded to the email. This potentially creates a
non-response bias, which I will discuss in more details in a later subsection.
The key explanatory variable is the percentage of total expenses spent on charita-
ble programs, or, more shortly, program percentage. This number is commonly used
by charity rating institutes as an important indicator of a charity’s quality. A higher
program percentage usually implies higher efficiency. Since the hypothesis I intend to
test is that a better charity has less tendency to adopt a checkout strategy, I expect
to see a negative coefficient for this key variable of interest.
BBB also provides their own charity rating measures. They have listed in total
twenty standards mainly concerning a charity’s governance, effectiveness, finances,
etc. and reported for each charity whether those standards are met. From this
23
piece of data, I obtain the variable, number of BBB standards not met by a charity.
Since BBB’s rating measure is not as straightforward and commonly used as program
percentage, I only regard it as supplementary information on a charity’s quality.
A third variable, reserve, defined as net asset divided by total income, might also
provide some additional information on quality. The inclusion of this variable is mo-
tivated by reports provided by the charity rating institute, CharityWatch. According
to CharityWatch, a good charity should not have asset reserves of more than three
years, since the dollars raised should be spent to carry out their missions, not to stock
up on assets. 3
In terms of other control variables, I first include charity’s age. Age might have an
effect on the tendency to adopt checkout donations. For instance, a long-existing char-
ity might have a larger member base, and hence relies more on traditional fundraising
methods, while a young charity might be more eager to try newer methods like check-
out ones.
I also include the natural log of total income in the year where the charity is
reviewed by BBB. Total income tells about the size and scale of a charity. It could be
the case that a larger charity has more resources to build relationships with grocery
stores to facilitate checkout donations. But a larger charity also tends to have more
resources to hold other types of fundraising events (e.g., galas), so it could also be
the case that a larger charity tends to forgo checkout opportunities.
Some additional charity characteristics are also included in the regression. Number
of paid staffs complements the income variable in controlling for the charity’s size, but
more on the physical side. The size of the board might affect the charity’s behavior,
since a larger board means more monitoring. And top compensation presents a trade-
off between CEO’s incentive and charity’s program percentage.
3Charity Rating Guide and Watchdog Report, Volume 62. December 2012. CharityWatch.
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Lastly, I create a set of dummy variables indicating which purpose categories a
charity belongs to. There are seven large categories such as education, health, and
international relief. The category division is originally based on summary statistics
found in CharityWatch reports. I could have used the 20 categories listed by BBB,
but due to a small sample size, I decide that a coarser division should be better for
identification.
1.5.2 Summary Statistics
Table 1.1 reports some summary statistics. The overall sample size is 185. The
subsample of charities with checkout strategies is 30, and the subsample without is
155. The first two columns give the variable means and medians of the subsample with
checkout strategies, and the next two columns the ones without. The last two columns
report p-values for the t- and z-test for the hypothesis that the two groups have the
same means or medians, respectively. For the key variable, program percentage, the
group with checkout strategies has both lower mean and lower median than the group
without. And to reduce effects of possible outliers, I winsorise the variable at the 5%
level, which is also done in the later regressions. The t- and z-tests show that the
3.21 difference in mean and the difference of 1 in median are both significant at the
10% level after the winsorization.
So without controlling for any other factors, it seems that on an average sense,
charities with checkout strategies have lower program percentage, hence efficiency,
than the ones without. Another variable that displays significant difference in mean
and median for the two groups is log income. The group with checkout strategies are,
on average, larger in scale than the one without. However, since there are no controls
or regression models used, these results are inconclusive.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Notes: The table presents the summary statistics of charity characteristics based on 185
nation-wide charities with data on whether checkout donation is implemented. Data on
checkout donation is obtained through an email survey. All other data are obtained from
BBB, which provides charity information based on Form 990. Program percentage is the
the percentage of total expenses spent on charitable programs. BBB standards not met is
the number of BBB standards that a charity does not meet. Reserve is net asset divided by
total income. Age is a charity’s age. Log(income) is the natural logarithm of a charity’s total
annual income. Compensation % is the top executive total compensation divided by total
income. Board size is the size of charity board. # paid staff is the number of charity’s paid
staff. Columns (1) to (4) report the sample mean and median for two subgroups based on
whether checkout donation is implemented, and columns (5) and (6) list the p-values for the
test on equality of sample mean and median using t-test and Wilcoxon z-test, respectively.
See the text for further details on the definition of variables. *,**,*** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
A: Mindless B: No Mindless Tests on
(N=30) (N=155) Sample Difference
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Program % 80.60 82.00 83.81 83.00 0.048∗∗ 0.065 ∗
BBB standards not met 0.66 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.387 0.097
Reserve 1.00 0.66 0.95 0.67 0.824 0.623
Age 29.13 27.50 31.58 23.00 0.557 0.780
Log(income) 16.94 16.55 15.72 15.60 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Compensation % 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.000∗∗∗ 0.072∗
Board size 18.66 16.00 15.16 12.00 0.131 0.124
# Paid staff 260.93 51.00 140.14 21.50 0.477 0.041∗∗
1.5.3 Model and Results
To estimate the effect of program percentage on “probability of checkout,” I run
a probit regression (and a logit regression as a robustness check) with the following
model:
Pr(CheckoutDonation) = F (Xβ)
where X is a vector of variables including program percentage and other controls,
and F is the standard normal distribution for the probit (or logistic distribution for
the logit) model. The estimation results for three specifications are reported in Table
1.2.
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Table 1.2: Charity Quality and Checkout Donation
Notes: The table presents the coefficients from probit and logit regressions of the use of
checkout donation on charity quality. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a charity
uses checkout donation and 0 otherwise. Program percentage is the the percentage of total
expenses spent on charitable programs. Seven category dummies for charity purpose are
created. The last row reports the sample average marginal effect of program percentage.
The numbers in the parenthesis are standard errors. *,**,*** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Probit Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Program % -0.0283∗ -0.0542∗∗∗ -0.0610∗∗∗ -0.0516∗ -0.1000∗∗∗ -0.1069∗∗∗
(0.0147) (0.0183) (0.0203) (0.0269) (0.0334) (0.0366)
BBB standards not met -0.0640 -0.0616 -0.1013 -0.1074
(0.0817) (0.0926) (0.1466) (0.1623)
Reserve -0.0238 0.0477 -0.1021 0.0146
(0.1202) (0.1341) (0.2271) (0.2563)
Age -0.0165∗∗ -0.0144∗ -0.0310∗∗ -0.0258∗
(0.0074) (0.0081) (0.0144) (0.0150)
Log(income) 0.2758∗ 0.2965∗∗ 0.5029∗ 0.5439∗∗
(0.1431) (0.1489) (0.2632) (0.2746)
Compensation % -11.3234 -13.2894 -20.1049 -23.7835
(9.1942) (10.0334) (17.0454) (18.4936)
Board size 0.0099 0.0050 0.0164 0.0060
(0.0136) (0.0155) (0.0234) (0.0282)
# Paid staff -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Category dummies X X
Observations 181 181 181 181 181 181
F -statistics 3.81 28.80 45.44 3.83 31.97 45.25
Pseudo R2 0.024 0.181 0.285 0.024 0.181 0.284
Average marginal effect -0.0067 -0.0108 -0.0105 -0.0068 -0.0112 -0.0104
of program
In the first specification, I include only the key variable, program percentage. The
probit coefficient in column one is −0.028 and is significant at the 10% level. The
average marginal effect is −0.0067, which means that on average, a 1 percentage point
decrease in program percentage is associated with a 0.67 percentage point increase in
the probability of using checkout.
In the second column, I include all the control variables except for the category
dummies. The variable program percentage is still negative and significant, but now
at the 1% level. The average marginal effect also becomes larger at −0.0108, which
means that a 1 percentage point decrease in program percentage is associated with a 1
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percentage point increase in probability of checkout. Two other variables significant
are age and log income. Age has a coefficient of −0.017, is significant at the 1%
level, and has an average marginal effect of −0.0033. As mentioned before, a possible
explanation is that older charities have more affiliate members so it is easier to perform
more traditional fundraising acts such as membership appeals, while younger charities
do not have specific targets and thus use checkout methods to target everybody. The
other significant–but only at the 10% level–variable is log income, with a positive
coefficient of 0.276. So it seems that larger charities have more tendency to use
checkout methods. One thing that should be noted is that, a charity’s size does not tell
much about its quality–a charity with high income could have a low program expense
percentage and a high asset reserve, hence low efficiency. Indeed, the correlation
between log income and program percentage is around 0.11 and insignificant at the
10% level for both the Pearson and Spearman methods. Both reserve and BBB
standards unmet have negative signs, which is consistent with the conjecture that
higher quality charity does less “checkout”, but both are too insignificant to draw
any conclusion from.
In the third column, I further include the set of category dummies. The inclusion
of dummies does not change the results much. The coefficient for program percentage
is now−0.061, and still highly significant, with an average marginal effect of −0.0105.
Age has become slightly less significant, but still significant at the 10% level. And log
income is now significant at the 5% level. Reserve now has a positive coefficient, but
is still highly insignificant. The results for the rest of the variables are similar to the
second specification. The only category dummy that is significant is education, which
has a marginal effect of 0.14. This can be interpreted as charities that have education
as their main purpose are 14% more likely to adopt checkout methods. This is not
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surprising, in the sense that it is common to encounter charities concerning kids and
their education in places such as grocery stores.
The results from the logit regressions are highly similar to the ones from probit.
For the key variable, program percentage, the average marginal effect is also around
−0.007 when no controls are added, and around −0.01 when controls are added.
In any case, program percentage is negative and significant. And on average, a 1
percentage point decrease in program percentage is associated with approximately 1
percentage point increase in probability of checkout.
To provide a richer illustration of program percentage’s effect than the average
marginal effect, I also calculate the “predicted probabilities of checkout” of an “aver-
age” charity with program percentage valued at different sample deciles. The charity
is “average” in the sense that all its non-dummy variables (except for program per-
centage) takes value at sample means, and in terms of the category dummies, it falls
into either education or health category, since they are the two largest categories and
education is the only category with positive and significant coefficient. The predicted
results for both the Probit and Logit models are reported in Table 1.3. As depicted
in the table, for both categories in both models, as program percentage goes from a
higher decile to a lower one, the probability of checkout rises in a monotonic manner.
For instance, for an average charity in the education category, its predicted prob-
ability of using checkout is 0.043 if program percentage is in the highest decile, as
compared to 0.494 for the lowest decile. This is to say, this average charity with a
program percentage of 72 is over ten times more likely to adopt a checkout strategy
than an otherwise same charity with a program percentage of 100. The results for
an average charity in the health category are similar. The probability of checkout
increases as program percentage decreases, with 0.021 for the highest program per-
centage decile and 0.369 for the lowest. The same patterns appear in the Logit model
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as well as when using the second specification in Table 1.2 without controlling for
category dummies.
Table 1.3: Predicted Probability of Implementing Checkout Donation
Notes: The table presents the predicted probabilities of a charity using checkout dona-
tion based on probit and logit regressions with full explanatory variables from Table 1.2.
Probabilities are evaluated at deciles of program percentage and sample means of all other
non-dummy explanatory variables. Columns (1) and (3) provide the predicted probabilities
for a charity belonging to the education category, and columns (2) and (4) the health cate-
gory. The last row reports the differences between the lowest and highest deciles. Column
(5) gives the market share of charities in education or health categories in each decile in
terms of number of charities.
Predicted Probability Market Share of
Probit Logit Education and Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1st: program%=72 0.494 0.369 0.513 0.389 0.81
2nd: program%=76 0.398 0.282 0.407 0.293 0.42
3rd: program%=79 0.329 0.224 0.333 0.231 0.25
4th: program%=82 0.266 0.173 0.266 0.179 0.47
5th: program%=83 0.247 0.158 0.245 0.164 0.79
6th: program%=85 0.210 0.130 0.208 0.137 0.71
7th: program%=88 0.161 0.095 0.160 0.103 0.52
8th: program%=91 0.120 0.068 0.121 0.077 0.65
9th: program%=95 0.078 0.041 0.083 0.052 0.56
10th: program%=100 0.043 0.021 0.050 0.031 0.67
Difference between 0.451 0.348 0.463 0.358
1st and 10th
The results presented above provide empirical support for the prediction from the
separating equilibrium in the model section that it is the lower-quality charities that
have a higher tendency to use checkout donations.
1.5.4 Non-Response Bias
Since the dependent variable is collected from an email survey, the data could
potentially suffer from a non-response bias. From the 761 emails sent, only 185 got
replied. In order to make sure that the response group is representative of the entire
surveyed group, I perform a set of tests to show that the characteristics of the response
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group are not significantly different from those of the entire surveyed group. Table
1.4 gives the test results.
Table 1.4: Non-Response Bias
Notes: The table presents p-values of a set of hypothesis tests on non-response bias. For
all non-dummy variables, column (1) shows p-values from testing the hypothesis that the
response group and the entire group have the same variable means, using t-test with unequal
variance. Column (2) shows p-values from testing on the equality of variable medians of the
two groups. For dummy variables, the test is on the equality of proportion and the p-values
are reported in column (3). Column (4) reports the p-values from testing the hypothesis
of zero Pearson’s correlation between a charity’s characteristics and whether it responded.
More variables are considered here than those used in regression specifications. Log(assets)
and Log(net assets) are the logarithm of a charity’s total assets and net assets. Fundraising
% and Administrative % are the percentage of fundraising expenses and administrative
expenses on total expenses. Charities are divided into four region groups based on their
incorporated states, and region dummies are created accordingly. Leverage is the ratio
between a charity’s debts and total assets. See the text for details on the definition of other
variables. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Mean Median Proportion Correlation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Program % 0.626 0.935 0.531
BBB standards not met 0.389 0.563 0.281
Reserve 0.631 0.870 0.631
Age 0.101 0.279 0.049∗∗
Log(income) 0.878 0.623 0.848
Compensation % 0.028∗∗ 0.174 0.205
Board size 0.358 0.334 0.406
# Paid staff 0.209 0.907 0.359
Log(assets) 0.934 1.000 0.918
Log(net assets) 0.932 0.656 0.910
Fundraising % 0.671 0.449 0.570
Administrative % 0.228 0.289 0.141
Leverage 0.720 1.000 0.621
Category dummy 1 0.256 0.134
Category dummy 2 0.323 0.203
Category dummy 3 0.891 0.859
Category dummy 4 0.665 0.576
Category dummy 5 0.947 0.931
Category dummy 6 0.623 0.527
Category dummy 7 0.764 0.700
Region dummy 1 0.874 0.840
Region dummy 2 0.607 0.511
Region dummy 3 0.813 0.762
Region dummy 4 0.341 0.217
Column 1 shows the p-values from testing the hypothesis that the response group
and the entire group have the same (non-dummy) variable means allowing for unequal
variance. The only significant one is top compensation. But since the test is performed
on thirteen variables and only one difference is significantly non-zero at the 95%
confidence level, this is close to the expected number of significant differences if the
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two groups are sampled from the same distribution. Therefore, there is no clear sign
of a systematic bias due to nonresponses. The second column gives the p-values from
testing the equality of variable medians of the two groups. None of the differences are
significant. For the dummy variables, a test on the equality of proportion is performed
and none of the p-values in column 3 indicates any significant difference. The last
column reports the p-values for testing the hypothesis of zero-correlation between a
charity’s characteristics and whether it responses, and the only significant variable is
age.
The above test results suggest that the response group is overall not significantly
different from the entire surveyed group. Hence, the inference made from the response
group should not suffer from any systematic non-response bias.
1.6 Conclusion
The meaning for checkout donations to exist is two-fold. First, checkout donations
provide the inferior charities with a platform to exploit the “purpose and others” di-
mension of asymmetric information, i.e., the “mindlessness” of consumers, to achieve
a higher public good provision. Since the take-it- or leave-it amount is so small,
consumers do not bother to search. And since consumers do not acquire information
regarding purpose and others of the charity, they simply donate the asked amount.
So in a sense, checkout donation and purpose obscurity hurt the consumers by not
letting them make fully informed decisions. Yet exactly through this “trick,” checkout
donations achieve a higher public good provision, which, in turn, benefits the con-
sumers. Second, checkout donations provide charities with the opportunity to signal
their quality. If there is no such signal to separate high and low quality charities, the
overall quality is diluted by the existence of low quality charities and consumers be-
come even more reluctant to give. So the extra strategy of checkout donations clears
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up this inefficiency. Then a reasonable question to ask would be, is this signaling
feature unique to the checkout donation strategy? The answer is likely to be no. In
the real world, we observe similar fundraising strategies with slight differences. For
instance, a frequently observed strategy similar to the take-it- or leave-it one is to also
collect donations at checkouts but ask for open-ended donations with small suggested
amounts to select from, e.g., “$1, $2, $5 or other.” On the contrary, letters arriving in
the mail might ask for “$100, $200, $500, or other.” It is not “open vs. epsilon” any-
more, but it still has a similar flavor–one could then think of the suggested amount as
a signal of quality. Furthermore, one might argue that search is not really an option
in the grocery store due to time constraint. If this is the case, then the locational
choice itself might serve as a signal of quality, since inferior charities are more likely
to think of exploiting this inconvenience of shoppers. Hence, this study on checkout
donations might serve as a primitive study of a whole class of fundraising strategies
that operate as signaling mechanisms for quality. And even if this class of fundraising
strategies is adopted by lower quality charities only, we might not want to hastily
judge such strategies with a negative frame of mind, because they might very well
come with negative externalities that hurt consumers individually, while benefiting
them collectively by combating the positive externality of public goods.
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Chapter 2
A WELFARE IMPLICATION OF CORPORATE GIVING: THEORY AND
EVIDENCE
2.1 Introduction
It is frequently observed that corporations make donations to charities. This phe-
nomena might seem contradictory to the universal assumption that firms are profit-
driven. It is especially puzzling, as charities build public goods, and publilc goods
should only benefit consumers, not corporations. Since it is hard to imagine that
corporations are giving money away on a purely altruistic ground, there has to be
underlying channels of chritable giving through which profits are generated. In this
paper, I propose two intertwined channels linked to firm image to explain the donation
behavior of profit-driven firms.
Corporate donation is often covered in news articles, disclosed on company web-
sites, or made observable to consumers through other forms of communication. For
example, the Fortune magazine, with help from The Chronicle of Philanthropy, has
published the top 20 most generous companies of the Fortune 500 in 2016.1 Without
help from newspapers or magazines, stores could also put up signs telling shoppers
how much they have donated. So charitable donations, due to high visibility, could
generate an image effect among the consumers. I call this channel a direct image
effect. When this effect exists, firms would want to use charitable donations to en-
hance company image and attract consumers. However, charitable giving is not the
only action deemed socially responsible. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) in-
1Preston, Caroline. “The 20 Most Generous Companies of the Fortune 500.” Fortunes, 22, 06,
2016, http://fortune.com/2016/06/22/fortune-500-most-charitable-companies/.
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corporates a wide variety of activities that “go beyond firm’s legal and contractual
obligations”, as described by Be´nabou and Tirole (2010). Therefore, environmental
friendliness, product safety, employee relations, and so on all factor into an overall
level of responsibility. Not all of these CSR activities count towards public goods.
For example, a firm that treats its employees exceptionally nicely is regarded as so-
cially responsible, but this does not directly benefit all consumers in the economy.
But all things equal, consumers might still like such a firm better than other ones,
simply because it is “nicer.” As for environmental friendliness, which is usually con-
sidered a public good, there exist past events indicating that consumers care. For
example, Barrage et al. (2014) find out that following the British Petroleum oil spill
in 2010, consumers punish BP by switching to its competitors. Yet, a firm’s overall
responsibility might not be fully observable to the consumers. A great deal of social
responsibility is predetermined by a firm’s production technology, (e.g. whether the
technology is clean or not, safe or not, etc.) which is most likely unobservable. But
consumers like firms that are “nicer.” As a result, it is sensible for firms to reveal its
virtue to consumers using an observable signal. And even if a firm’s CSR activities
are observable, it could be hard to get a precise measure on them. On the other
hand, charitable donations are easy to measure in monetary terms. Hence, charitable
donation, due to its visibility and measurability, could be a good signal for overall
CSR. In this way, charitable donation affects firm image both directly and through
the revelation of firm’s overall responsibility.
To incorporate both the direct image and the signal motives into a competitive
environment, I adopt a simple Hotelling type of model (Hotelling, 1929), where two
firms compete with each other using both price and donation. All else equal, a
lower price attracts more consumers, but a higher donation does so as well due to
an enhanced social image. Both the price and the direct image effects are reflected
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in consumer’s utility. So there is not only an optimal price, but also an optimal
donation level that yields the firm highest profits. I also assume that firms are of
different levels of responsibility, which is a predetermined trait of the firms. For
example, oil companies are commonly regarded as environmentally unfriendly. But
an oil company that uses efficient drilling rigs and adopts better safety measures could
be more responsible than its competitors. When such responsibleness is hidden from
the consumers, charitable donation works as a costly signal, and I show that there
exists an equilibrium where a high type overdonates in order to separate itself from
the low type.
The model explains why it could be optimal for profit-driven firms to give money
to charities, especially when there is asymmetric information. But the information
asymmetry leads to overdonation of the high type, which is a source of inefficiency
for the firm, as compared to a world with no information asymmetry. However, this
information failure might not yield a bad consequence for the overall economy. This
is because when public goods are involved, there already exists a source of inefficiency
due to free-riding among consumers. Classic models such as Bergstrom et al. (1986)
predict that voluntary provision of public goods is always socially suboptimal. Here,
the information asymmetry leads to a high level of firm donation, which could enhance
social welfare. First of all, the overdonation of the high type leads to a higher company
image enjoyed by the consumers. Second, the higher overall firm donation level crowds
out voluntary giving, but also allows the consumers to allocate spared income to
private good consumption, while still being able to enjoy a high level of public goods
due to the firms’ contribution. And last but not the least, if firm donation is very high,
consumers could become constrained to free-ride on the firms as much as they would
like to, so free-riding is mitigated on a certain level. Overall, when the image and
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signaling mechanisms exist, firms might earn lower profits due to charitable givings,
but the consumers and society as a whole benefit from better public good provisions.
To investigate whether there exists an image effect of charitable donations, I use
donation data collected from database NOZAsearch to test whether a firm that is
“closer” to consumers make more donations. I construct a “closeness” variable using
the Bureau of Economic Analysis input-output data that tells how much of a firm’s
costumer base consists of common consumers. The “closer” to consumers a firm is,
the more it should care about its image, and hence the more it should donate. I
find that firm donation is positively affected by the firm’s “closeness” to consumers,
and this effect is especially significant when only local donations are considered, as
local donations are more readily observed by consumers. In an additional test, I use
a fractional multinomial logit model to test whether there is any relation between a
firm’s industry and the cause category of its charitable donations. I obtain the results
that firms donate to causes that are related to its line of business. For example, food
firms donate more to the food cause, and medical firms donate more to the health
cause. One explanation for this result is again the image story.
2.2 Related Literature
Although this paper concerns mainly charitable donations, it can fit into the
broader literature of corporate social responsibility (CSR). One main theme of the
CSR literature focuses on why firms behave as good “corporate citizens” (term
adopted from Be´nabou and Tirole (2010)) and many studies in this literature are
closely related to this paper. For example, Kotchen and Moon (2012) finds that
corporations use CSR activities to offset previous irresponsible behavior. Although
they do not explicitly mention image, their result clearly imply that firms care about
their company image and do not want consumers to see them as socially irrespon-
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sible. Siegel and Vitaliano (2007) divide products into “search” and “experience”
goods, where “search” goods have attributes fully observable to consumers before the
purchase, while “experience” goods need to be consumed first for their attributes to
be revealed. The authors find that companies that sell “experience” goods are more
likely to be socially responsible than the ones that sell “search” goods. This result im-
plies that CSR activities should have some signaling values when product attributes
are unobservable. Servaes and Tamayo (2013) show that advertising intensity is pos-
itively related to CSR news coverage. By interacting advertising intensity and CSR
intensity, they further show that CSR has a more positive effect on firm performance
when advertising intensity is higher. Their interpretation is that advertising increases
consumers’ awareness of the firms, leading to a stronger effect of CSR on firm value.
The relationship between CSR and firm value is another main theme of the CSR
literature. Margolis et al. (2007) conduct a meta-analysis of such empirical studies,
whose results are mixed, and the average relation is positive but small.
I should note that the standard dataset used in the CSR literature is the Kinder,
Lydenberg, Domini Research & Analytics (KLD) Social Ratings Database, which is
a panel dataset on social performance of public firms. This paper, however, does not
use the KLD dataset. This is mainly because KLD encompasses a broad range of
CSR activities including things such as corporate governance and employee relations,
and is not pertinent to the donation topic of my study. In this study, I only focus on
donations, because it is a very direct and clear form of contribution to public goods.
Hence, I hand-collect charitable donation data from the NOZAsearch database. Un-
like KLD variables that are all dummy variables, the donation data I collect has
specific values or ranges. Therefore, by focusing on donation data only, I forgo data
of some CSR activities that are less relevant to public goods, but arrive at a more
precise measure of donation than the KLD data.
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Unlike the above mentioned studies, this paper does not only focus on empirical
findings, but also builds a model to explain corporate donations and subsequently
analyze the effect on public good provisions. The provision of public good has been
extensively studied. The classic model predicts that the level of public goods provided
is below the socially optimal level due to free-riding among consumers, and govern-
ment provision crowds out private provision completely (Bergstrom et al., 1986, for
example). Besley and Ghatak (2007) model CSR in a Bertrand competitive environ-
ment and reach their main conclusion that CSR does not change the total level of
public good provisions, either. Bagnoli and Watts (2003), on the other hand, reach
an inconclusive result and state that CSR might increase public good provision under
certain conditions.
The paper is also related to some papers in both the economic and finance liter-
ature regarding how firms might adopt costly means to signal hidden characteristics.
A well-known example is the study by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) on advertising
intensity. The authors point out that expensive advertisements are not just used by
firms to introduce products to consumers, but rather a costly signal to convey the
message that the product is of good quality. Miller and Rock (1985) argue that a
firm’s dividend is not just money paid to the shareholder but also works as a signal
to let the stock market know of the firm’s good financial performance. The signaling
story in this paper has a similar flavor, and builds on the classic Spence (1973) job
market signaling model.
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2.3 Model
2.3.1 Setup
There are two firms in the market of a private good. Although they belong to the
same market, the products they sell are not the same in the eyes’ of the consumers,
because the consumers have slightly differentiated taste for the two products. One
example of this situation is the market of soda drinks, where Coca Cola and Pepsi are
almost the same product, but consumers might prefer one over the other to varying
extents. This type of differentiated taste is captured by a standard Hotelling (1929)
model. If a consumer is “located” closer to firm 1 than to firm 2, then he has a
personal taste that makes him more inclined to purchase the good from firm 1, when
all else is equal. I assume that the length of the market is l, and use x to denote a
consumer’s “distance” to firm 1. However, the distance of the consumer is not the
only thing that determines whether he purchases from firm 1 or 2: the two firms also
have different overall responsibility. I let r1 denote the predetermined level of CSR
(e.g., clean technology) of firm 1, and assume that r1 is higher than r2 of firm 2. The
overall responsibility is reflected in consumer’s utility of purchasing the good. The
consumer’s purchasing decision is also affected by the prices the firms charge, as in
the standard Hotelling model.
Apart from the private good, there is also a public good in this economy. Both the
firms and the consumers could contribute to the public good by making charitable
donations. Firms’ donations, d1 and d2, are measured as effective donations, that is,
how much public good is built. (Effective donation, the amount of public good raised,
might be lower than the actual monetory donation made by the firm.) Consumers get
to enjoy the public good, but not the firms. Hence, the action of donating is costly
for the firms and does not benefit firms directly. However, it might help firms attract
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consumers through a direct image effect. So all else equal, making a larger donation
means capturing a larger share of the market. On top of being an image enhancer,
I further consider the case where donation could function as a signal when there is
asymmetric information. I assume that the responsibility of firms are known among
the firms, but not the consumers. That is, consumers only know that firms could be
either high type or low type with equal probability, but do not know the actual types
of the firms. In this case, the firms, especially the good type, might want to signal
their types through public good donations. I assume that before setting the product
price, the donation decision is made and observed by all agents.
The profit function of a type j firm can be written as
pij(dj, rj) = b(d1, d2, r1, r2)− k(dj, rj)
where b is the benefit, and k is the cost function, with brj > 0, bdj > 0, kdj > 0 and
kdjdj > 0. The cost function also satisfies the single-crossing condition krjdj < 0. That
is, the firm with the higher responsibility, r1, has a lower marginal cost of donating.
This assumption is especially realistic if there exists positive assortative matching
between firms and charities, that is, higher responsible firm donates to higher quality
charities. Then firms of higher responsiblity spends less to have a certain level of
effective donations made. There also exists anecdotal events that show that good
charities might refuse donations from companies considered irresponsible, such as to-
bacco companies. Also, the cost of donating could also include non-pecuniary costs
such as transaction cost. If firms with higher social responsibility have better estab-
lished partnerships with charities, then they are likely to incur lower transaction costs
when arranging donations. The benefit b(r, d) is derived as in the Hotelling model.
The benefit is calculated as price times the share of the market. But since the pricing
decision is made after the donation decision is made, price is just a function of d, and
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does not show in the b function. The share of the market a firm gets is determined
by the consumers’ decision of which firm to purchase the private good from.
The consumers observe the effective donations and product prices of the two firms.
They then decide which one of the two firms to purchase the good from. For a
consumer at distance x, his utility from the purchase is c = −x− p1 + αr1 + 1(d1 ≥
d2) · β · (d1 − d2), if purchased from firm 1; and is c = −(l − x)− p2 + αr2 + 1(d2 ≥
d1) · β · (d2 − d1), if purchased from firm 2. Since the good itself is the same whether
purchased from firm 1 or 2, the utility gained directly from the good itself is simply
set to be 0. The distance is subtracted from utility as in the standard Hotelling
model, and p1 and p2 are prices charged by the two firms, respectively, and are thus
also subtracted. α is a parameter between 0 and 1 that represents consumers’ general
awareness about corporate social responsibility. Consumers know that the high type
is associated with r1 and low type with r2, but when there is information asymmetry,
they do not know whether a firm is high or low. In this case, consumers rely on the
signals, d1 and d2 to make the purchasing decision.
Apart from serving as a potential signal, d1 and d2 also enter consumers’ utility
directly as an image component. 1(d1 ≥ d2) is an indicator, so if firm 1’s donation
exceeds that of firm 2, then consumers will receive a positive direct image effect
from firm 1, which is the difference between the two donation levels multiplied by a
parameter, β, also between 0 and 1; but there is no direct image effect for firm 2, the
one with the lower donation level. The reason I use the difference between donation
levels instead of the actual levels to characterize the direct image effect is that for
certain industries, firms are expected or even required to give, especially locally, to
charities, so the level of giving should not fully capture the direct image effect on
consumers, but rather, a firm needs to “go the extra mile” to convince the consumers
that it is socially responsible. Therefore, I assume that only the firm with the higher
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donation level attracts consumers with a direct image component in the utility, and
the image is characterized by the exceeded amount in donation. 2
The consumers decide the firm to purchase from to maximize utility of the private
good consumption. In addition to the purchasing decision, consumers could also make
voluntary donations to build the public good. Consumers’ objective is to maximize
utility. But since the purchasing decision and donation decision do not affect each
other, the purchasing decision could be viewed as the first stage, and the discussion
of the donation decision is delayed to the welfare section. 3
The sequence of events is the following. Knowing their own and each other’s type,
firms first decide simultaneously how much donations to make. Then, after donations
are observed by all agents, firms decide simultaneously how much price to charge
for the good they sell. After observing firms’ decisions, consumers choose which of
the two firms to purchase the good from. (They also decide their own donations to
the public good, which will be discussed in the welfare section.) In the following
subsections, I solve the model backwards for both the symmetric and asymmetric
information cases.
2.3.2 Solving the Model, Symmetric Information
Before focusing on separating equilibria under asymmetric information, I first
solve the simple model assuming that firm type is observed by the consumers. Since
consumers only differ in x, the distance to firm 1, I solve the model using the standard
2The results in Propositions 1 and 2 do not change if I replace 1(di ≥ dj) · β · (di − dj) with
β ·(di−dj) in consumer’s utility function. It only changes the solution in social planner’s problem and
makes the welfare in social planner’s problem even higher compared to the welfare under symmetric
and asymmetric information.
3I use log-linear form for consumer’s full utility, that is ui = ci + w − gi + γlog(G + d1 + d2).
Then, the solution for the ci part and the solution of gi are separate from each other. Moreover, the
purchasing decision is determined by firms’ donation decisions, and firms’ donation decisions are not
affected by consumers’ voluntary donations. So the purchasing decision should not change whether
the full utility including public good consumption is considered.
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technique in solving the basic Hotelling model. I start by finding the indifferent
consumer, denoted as x∗, who is indifferent between purchasing from firm 1 or firm
2, that is
−x∗ − p1 + αr1 + β(d1 − d2) = −(l − x∗)− p2 + αr2 ,
then the indifferent consumer is located at
x∗ =
1
2
l − 1
2
(p1 − p2) + α
2
(r1 − r2) + β
2
(d1 − d2) .
Since all consumers closer to firm 1 than the indifferent consumer will purchase the
product at firm 1, and all consumers farther than the indifferent consumer go to firm
2, the profits of the two firms can be computed as follows:
pi1 = x
∗(p1 − k)− k(d1, r1)
pi2 = (l − x∗)(p2 − k)− k(d2, r2)
Since the firms set prices after the donation decisions are made and observed, the
optimal prices can be written as functions of the d’s. Then after substituting and
simplifications, the profits of the firms can be rewritten as functions of d’s only:
pi1 = 2[
l
2
+
α
6
(r1 − r2) + β
6
(d1 − d2)]2 − k(d1, r1)
pi2 = 2[
l
2
+
α
6
(r2 − r1) + β
6
(d2 − d1)]2 − k(d2, r2)
Claim 0. Let (dSI1 , d
SI
2 ) be the symmetric information solutions. Then we have
dSI1 > d
SI
2 .
Proof: See Appendix.
It is intuitive that the firm with a lower cost to donate donates more. It is also
intuitive that the more consumers care about the direct image from donations, the
more firms are willing to donate in order to attract consumers, as the following result
states.
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Proposition 0. The sum of dSI1 and d
SI
2 is increasing in β.
Proof: See Appendix. 4
2.3.3 A “Separating” Equilibrium, Asymmetric Information
The focus of the paper is more on the scenario when the firm types are not
observable by the consumers. In this case, firms use public good donations as a signal
for their hidden type. I will focus on separating equilibrium where firm 1 donates
more than firm 2 to signal its high type because firm 1’s cost of donating is lower.
The separating equilibrium is not the standard one in signaling games. Instead of one
firm of two possible types, there are actually two firms of two types. But the spirit of
“signaling” remains, in the sense that when consumers observe the equilibrium levels
of donations, they fully infer the type of the firms. The game includes two firms
competing with each other to attract consumers using donation and price. Since
price is set after donations are made and observed, the best response price is just a
function of the donation decisions. So in a separating equilibrium, consumers only
need to observe the donation levels to know the firm type and equilibrium price
and make the decision of which firm to purchase from accordingly. On the firms’
side, the firms fully anticipate consumers’ reaction to the donation decisions and
maximize their profits accordingly. Since the existence of equilibria hinges upon the
belief consumers hold when observing the donation levels, I will first pin down one
particular belief and discuss separating equilibria based on that belief.
Consumer Belief
Suppose that firm 1’s equilibrium action is to donate d˜1, and firm 2’s equilibrium
action is d˜2, where d˜1 > d˜2. Let the consumers’ belief be the following: if they
4For Claim 0 and Proposition 0, only interior solutions are considered. When β is small, that is,
the direct image effect is small, firms might not have enough incentive to donate to public goods.
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observe a donation level greater than or equal to d˜1, they believe it is a high type;
if they observe a donation level strictly lower than d˜1, they believe it is a low type.
The construction of this belief is adopted from Spence (1973). Given this particular
belief, I can state some properties of separating equilibria in the following two claims.
Both claims aim to compare the donation levels in any separating equilibrium under
asymmetric information with donation levels in the symmetric information solution
mentioned above.
Claim 1. If (d˜1, d˜2) is a separating equilibrium outcome under the above belief,
then it has to be the case that d˜1 ≥ dSI1 .
Proof: See Appendix.
Under certain parameter levels, it could be the case that the (dSI1 , d
SI
2 ) solution in
the symmetric information case can be supported as a separating equilibrium under
the asymmetric case. This requires that the responsibility component in consumers’
utility does not differ too much for the two types of firms, that is, α∆r is small. I
will provide a specific numerical example later in the paper to provide an idea of
what is “small”. However, I will focus on the case where α∆r is large, that is, firm’s
type matters a lot to consumers, as the separating equilibrium under asymmetric
information is then different from the symmetric information solution. So for the
results stated later in the paper, I will impose the assumption that α∆r is large
enough so that under asymmetric information, firm 1 donates strictly more than
under symmetric information. The intuition behind this case is that when consumers
care about firm’s responsibility, the low type has an incentive to pretend that it is a
high type. Then, the real high type, firm 1, would have to overdonate as compared
to the symmetric case, in order to separate itself from the lower type and ensure that
the lower type would not want to mimic the high donation.
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Claim 2. A separating equilibrium with d˜1 > d
SI
1 has the following properties:
(1) d˜1 + d˜2 > d
SI
1 + d
SI
2
(2) d˜1 − d˜2 > dSI1 − dSI2
Proof: See Appendix.
Claim 2 states that for any separating equilibrium with firm 1 overdonating, both
the sum of and the difference between the two firms’ donations exceed those in the
symmetric information case. The higher sum is contributed solely by firm 1’s over-
donation, as firm 2’s donation actually decreases as compared to the symmetric case.
But as shown in the proof, since firm 2’s best response with respect to firm 1’s do-
nation has a negative but flat slope, the sum of the two firms’ donations is higher.
And since firm 1 increases donation while firm 2 decreases donation, the difference
between the two firms’ levels is also higher under asymmetric information as com-
pared to the symmetric case. The intuition behind firm 1’s increase in donation is
explained in the previous claim. For the decrease in firm 2’s donation, the intuition
is the following. As firm 1 increases its donation, it also gets a higher share of the
market than in the symmetric case. A higher donation leads to a higher price, but
since firm 2 is left with a lower share of the market, its marginal benefit of donating
at the symmetric equilibrium level is lower than the marginal cost. So it would move
to a lower donation level so that marginal cost and marginal benefit are equal again.
Based on the above results, I further the analysis by showing the existence of
one particular separating equilibrium, due to the reason that I would like to use one
equilibrium as the reference point for asymmetric information case when comparing
social welfare with the symmetric information case. As mentioned before, in order for
the separation to hold, firm 1 needs to make enough donation such that firm 2 has
no incentive to mimic firm 1’s high level. The construction of the consumers’ belief
makes sure that firm 1 would not want to deviate downwards from its equilibrium
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level, because it would be mistaken as a low type. The higher firm 1’s equilibrium
level, the less incentive there is for firm 2 to mimic firm 1. The particular equilibrium
I state below has firm 1 donating at a level where firm 2 has exactly zero incentive
to pretend to be high type.
Proposition 1. When firm’s type q is unknown to consumers, there exists a
“separating equilibrium” with (dAI1 , d
AI
2 ) as the equilibrium donation levels, where
(1) dAI1 is such that firm 2 has exactly no incentive to deviate to d
AI
1 from d
AI
2 ;
(2) Given dAI1 , d
AI
2 solves firm 2’s FOC:
β
3
[ l
2
+ α
2
(r2−r1)+ β6 (d2−dAI1 )]−kd(d2, q2) =
0;
(3) The equilibrium prices are best responses to the donation levels;
(4) The consumer belief is that if d ≥ dAI1 , it is a firm of type q1; if d < dAI1 , it is of
type q2. And consumers choose to buy good from the firm that yields higher utility.
Proof: See Appendix.
The proof of the proposition is detailed in the Appendix. Here I provide some
brief intuition to why there is no incentive to deviate for both firms. First, firm 1
would not deviate to a higher level of donation than dAI1 because given d
AI
2 , firm 1’s
profit goes down as firm 1 increases its donation. But firm 1 would also not want
to decrease donation, because with the belief constructed this way, firm 1 would be
regarded as a low type if deviated down, and any lower donation level could not bring
firm 1 a higher profit than staying at dAI1 . As for firm 2, it would not deviate to
dAI1 by construction in condition (1). And it would not deviate to any level higher
than dAI1 even though it could appear to be high type because, intuitively, if firm 1
wouldn’t benefit from deviating up, firm 2 would certainly not benefit from that, as
it is more costly for firm 2 to spend its money on donations than firm 1. Finally,
for any donation level lower than dAI1 and other than d
AI
2 , firm 2 would not benefit
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from deviating to those because dAI2 solves the condition in (2), which is firm 2’s FOC
given dAI1 .
5
Claim 2 provides some properties of separating equilibria in general, so it should
apply to the equilibrium (dAI1 , d
AI
2 ) as well: d
AI
1 + d
AI
2 > d
SI
1 + d
SI
2 and d
AI
1 − dAI2 >
dSI1 −dSI2 . That is, both the sum of and difference between the two firms’ donations are
higher in the equilibrium in Proposition 1, where there is asymmetric information,
than when information is symmetric. In the separating equilibrium, information
asymmetry results in inefficiency for the firms, because a costly and dissipative signal
is needed in order to convey the hidden information. However, when there is public
good involved, there is also another type of inefficiency, namely the underprovision of
the public good. Due to the tendency to free-ride among consumers, the increase of
firm donation would crowd out consumers’ voluntary donations. But this also allows
consumers to enjoy the spared income. And the increase in the two firms’ difference
might also improve consumer welfare, since a larger difference in donation is reflected
as a stronger image effect in consumers’ utility. So consumer welfare should go up.
However, the question of concern is whether the increase in consumer welfare offsets
the loss in firm profits and makes social welfare higher when there is asymmetric
information.
2.4 Welfare Comparison
To calculate welfare, I first specify consumers’ full utility, that is, utility from
private good consumption as well as public good consumption, along with the decision
of donating to public goods. Suppose there are N consumers in the economy, and
5Under the same parameter levels, equilibrium donations higher than dAI1 for firm 1 might also
support separation, where firm 2 setting its equilibrium donation by again solving its FOC. These
equilibria will have firm 2 strictly prefer not to mimic firm 1’s level instead of being indifferent as in
(dAI1 , d
AI
2 ). I only look at (d
AI
1 , d
AI
2 ) since the same welfare result would apply to those equilibria.
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consumer i’s full utility is the following6:
ci + w − gi + γlog(G+ d1 + d2)
where ci is the utility from consuming the product, as specified in the previous sec-
tion, w is an exogenous income that is the same to all consumers and can be used
to purchase a numeraire good that is not produced, gi is the consumer’s voluntary
donation to public goods, and γlog(G+ d1 + d2) is the utility from total public good
consumption, which includes all consumers’ donations, that is G, and firms’ donations.
7 As mentioned earlier, the purchasing decision and donation decision do not affect
each other . So I regard the ci part as maximized in a first stage, and consumers play
a game where each chooses the voluntary donation, gi, to maximize his full utility in
the second stage. This approach is valid due to both the log-linear form of the utility,
and the fact that the purchasing decision is determined by firms’ donation decisions,
which are not affected by consumers’ voluntary donations. If consumers could choose
for the firms how much to donate, then the whole model would not be much differ-
ent from a standard voluntary donation game where consumers decide how much of
their endowment to contribute to public good. So it is an important assumption that
firms’ donation decisions are made upfront by some decision maker independent of
the consumers.
Suppose there is a social planner who maximizes social welfare as the sum of all
consumers’ utility and the firms’ profits. That is, the planner can choose d1, d2, p1,
6The reason of assuming N consumers instead of a continuum of consumers is a technical one.
If there is an infinite number of consumers, then the simple Nash equilibrium concept cannot be
applied to solve the donation game between them. So instead, I adopt the common approach in
setting up voluntary donation games, that is to assume that there are N consumers in the economy.
One way to reconcile this with the previous infinite setting is to argue that even though there is a
finite amount of consumers, their demand for a good could be of a different, continuous measure.
Another possibility is to alter the previous Hotelling setting into a market where N consumers locate
uniformly but discretely on a length of l. The model can still be solved with the same approach,
but is simply more straightforward to illustrate with the usual continuously uniform market.
7If CSR acitivities of the firms also count as public goods, then G could also include those.
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p2, which firm to purchase from and how much gi to donate for every consumer in
order to maximize:
C +W +G+Nγlog(G+ d1 + d2) + Π
where C is the aggregate private consumption, W the aggregate wealth, and Π the
aggregate profits of the two firms. The social planner’s solution is optimal, because
it takes into account the social benefit of the public good, so there is no free-riding
among the consumers. However, when consumers make their own donation decisions
using the simple Nash equilibrium concept, they do not take into account the positive
externality their own donation creates, and hence the public good is suboptimally
provided. In the baseline case, where there is no asymmetric information, firms donate
dSI1 and d
SI
2 , respectively. So given this, consumer i chooses gi to maximize utility.
And one constraint is that gi cannot be strictly negative. As for the asymmetric
information case, firms donate the equilibrium amounts dAI1 and d
AI
2 as in Proposition
1, and consumer i chooses gi ≥ 0 to maximize utility ci+w−gi+γlog(G+dAI1 +dAI2 ).
Similar to the social planner scenario, the social welfare is the sum of all consumers’
utility plus firms’ profits. This can be denoted as CSI +W +GSI +Nγlog(GSI +dSI1 +
dSI2 )+Π
SI and CAI +W +GAI +Nγlog(GAI +dAI1 +d
AI
2 )+Π
AI for the symmetric and
asymmetric information cases, respectively. Proposition 2 gives a welfare comparison
between the two.
Proposition 2. Social welfare is higher under asymmetric information than
under symmetric information. That is, CAI−GAI +Nγlog(GAI +dAI1 +dAI2 )+ΠAI >
CSI −GSI +Nγlog(GSI + dSI1 + dSI2 ) + ΠSI .
Proof: See Appendix.
Information asymmetry is usually a source of inefficiency and lowers social wel-
fare. This result, however, demonstrates that when public good is involved and there
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already exists inefficiency due to free-riding, asymmetric information might counter-
act the free-riding problem and eventually lead to higher social welfare. There are
several channels through which asymmetric information enhances welfare here. First
of all, when firm type is unclear, and consumers value the high type a lot more than
the low type, then the low type would like to disguise as a high type, while a high
type would not want to be mistaken as a low type. So the high type would go an
extra mile to separate itself from the low type by choosing a higher donation level
that the low type would not want to adopt. As a consequence, the difference between
high type and low type’s donations is higher. As mentioned before, this leads to a
higher direct image effect in consumers’ utility when purchasing from the high type
firm and enhances consumer welfare.
In addition to the difference, the sum of the two firms’ donations also rises due to
firm 1’s overdonating. A higher corporate donation certainly crowds out consumers’
voluntary donation. But this is not necessarily bad for consumers, since they can
allocate the spared income towards consumption of the numeraire good as they free-
ride on firms’ donations. This alone leads to higher consumer welfare. However, more
interesting is the scenario when the crowding out is not one to one. This happens
when firms’ donations are high enough, consumers decrease their voluntary donations
until they have hit the nonnegativity constraint and could not further decrease gi even
though they would like to. That is, consumers might not regard it as individually
optimal, because they desire to free-ride even more, but less free-riding means higher
social efficiency, and benefits consumers in the end. This binding situation of the
nonnegativity constraint allows for higher public good provision, and even higher
consumer welfare. Even though firms lose profit due to asymmetric information, the
inefficiency on the firm side is offset by the gain in efficiency due to higher public
good provision on the consumer side. Hence, social welfare is improved.
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In the next part, I use a specific numerical example to provide some straightfor-
ward illustration of the above result .
2.4.1 Numerical Example
In the numerical example, I set the parameters to be specific values and graph how
donations and welfare varies under the cases of social planner, symmetric information,
and asymmetric information. I also specify the cost function of firms to be a simple
quadratic form
k(di, ri) = (K − (ri − di))2
where K is a constant larger than r1 and r2 to ensure that kdi > 0 for all di > 0.The
parameter values are as follows: l = 10, β = 0.8, r1 = 5, r2 = 4, A = 5, γ = 2,
N = 3. I let α to vary between 0 and 1. I vary α because it represents the benefit of
a good firm separating itself from a bad firm. Therefore, it is interesting to see how
the benefit of signaling affects the welfare difference between symmetric and asym-
metric information. Figure 2.1 shows the numerical results. The horizontal axis is α
and the vertical axis represents different outcome variables of interest. Figure 2.1a
plots the total corporate donations. Social planner’s choice of d1 + d2 is the highest,
because the planner takes into account the social benefit of firms’ contribution to
public goods. Firms, on the other hand, only care about profits and use donation to
attract consumers, so the firms’ decisions lie below the planner’s choice, regardless of
symmetric or asymmetric information. But when information is asymmetric and α is
large enough, firms donate more in total due to firm 1’s overdonation in the separating
equilibrium. Exactly due to this increase in firm donation under asymmetric infor-
mation, consumers’ total voluntary donation decreases, as illustrated in Figure 2.1b.
Yet more interesting is when firm donations are high enough, consumers’ donations
go to zero and is bounded by the nonnegativity constraint. That is, consumers would
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like to free-ride more on firms’ donations by donating negative amounts, but are not
allowed to. So in a sense, free-riding is mitigated to some extent in the asymmetric
case when α is high enough. But the social inefficiency is still evident as the planner’s
choice for G is still above the individual decisions.
Figure 2.1: Parameter Values Supporting the Separating Equilibrium
Notes: This figure presents the numerical example of how donations and welfare vary under
the cases of social planner, symmetric information, and asymmetric information. The x-axis
is α, the responsibility parameter in each graph. The y-axis is firm public goods provision
in Figure (a), individual public goods contribution in Figure (b), firm profit in Figure (c),
and total welfare in Figure (d). Model parameters are as follows: l = 10, β = 0.8, e1 = 5,
e2 = 4, A = 5, α = 2, N = 3. See Section 2 and Appendix for the calculation of each
outcome variable.
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Figure 2.1c plots Π, which is firms’ total profit. It shows that firms lose some
profits when information is asymmetric. Figure 2.1d corresponds to the result in
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Proposition 2. The total social welfare is higher under asymmetric information than
symmetric, and the relation is strict as long as α is large enough. And at the point
of α where consumers hit the nonnegativity constraint, actual social welfare takes
off from the original trend which is denoted in the dash line. With an α this high,
firm 1 takes the extra step in donation level to separate from firm 2, leading to a
high total level of firm donations. The firm donations are so high that consumers are
unable to free-ride as much as they desire because of the nonnegativity constraint.
And the mitigated free-riding eventually leads to an even higher social welfare. This
mitigation effect is stronger when there is more consumers in the economy.
2.4.2 Model Conclusion
When information is perfect, a profit maximizing firm might find it optimal to do-
nate to public goods if donations affect company image and attract customers. When
there is information asymmetry, firms have an additional reason to over-contribute
in public goods. But the overdonation is not necessarily a bad thing. The welfare
results suggest that in a model where there already exists inefficiency due to ex-
ternality of public goods, adding a second layer of inefficiency, namely information
asymmetry, might not distort the economy further, but could potentially counteract
the inefficiency created by the public good provision and eventually improve social
welfare.
2.5 Empirical Tests
In this section, I report results of two empirical tests are consistent with the
hypothesis that the more consumers care about company image, regardless through
direct or indirect signaling channels, the more firms would donate to charities. It is
difficult to test directly the effect of firm donations on company image. So instead,
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I construct a “closeness” variable that tells whether a firm operates in an industry
that deals with consumers directly, and test whether a “closer” firm would donate
more to public goods. The underlying assumption is that the “closer” a firm is to the
consumers, the more noticeable and relevant its donations to the consumers, or, the
more image matters to both the consumers and the firm. In the second test, I use
a fractional multinomial logit regression aiming to see whether there is any relation
between a firm’s industry and the charitable cause of the donations it makes.
2.5.1 Data and Variables
The sample firms are the S&P 500 firms in year 2014. I use the 2014 list to search
for donations made by the firms from 1998 to 2014. The dataset is an unbalanced
panel because some firms do not donate to charities in some years. The donation data
is collected from NOZAsearch, a charitable donation database. NOZA’s database is
comprised of detailed charitable donation information collected from public available
internet locations. As of 2015, it contains more than 100 million donation records.
When a firm’s name is searched, the database will list out the donations made by the
firm, with details such as donation amount (or range), donation year, recipient of the
donation, cause of the donation, and so on. I aggregate firm donations at year level
and create a variable donation, which is the total amount of donations in millions
made by a firm in a year.8 NOZAsearch also reports whether donations are made to
charitable programs operating on a local or national scale, which the variables local
donation and national donation take into account. Very few donations are made
on an international scale.
The “closeness” variable is constructed using the 2007 benchmark input-output
data provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. It is called the personal con-
8All dollar amounts are stated in 2000 dollars deflated/inflated using CPI.
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sumption percentage (PCP), which is the percentage of an industry’s total revenue
that is attributed to direct consumer purchases. The detailed construction of PCP
follows the procedure used by Ahern and Harford (2014) and is detailed in the Ap-
pendix. Take the telephone apparatus manufacturing industry for an example. The
make table of BEA’s input-output data tells that the industry is the primary pro-
ducer of telephones, and secondary producer of other commodities such as wireless
equipments. For each of these commodities, I can compute the market share of the
telephone apparatus manufacturing industry in the commodity market from the make
table. Meanwhile, for each commodity, the use table lists all the industries that con-
sume the commodity and it can be calculated how much revenue a certain industry
contributes to each commodity market. The use table includes an industry called
“personal consumption expenditures”, which entails the common consumers. So us-
ing both the make and use tables, I obtain the share of revenue consumers contribute
to a certain industry, such as the telephone apparatus manufacturing industry. I call
this the personal consumption percentage and use it as a proxy for “closeness” to con-
sumers. The BEA uses its own industry classification, but also provides conversion
instructions into NAICS industry codes. One might be concerned that the industry
classification is broad, but the NAICS six-digit code in fact provides a rather refined
classification. Using the six-digit classification, I obtain 193 industries for the sample
firms, and the PCP variable takes 127 different values. In Figure 2.2 , I use the more
aggregated, three-digit NAICS code to show the mean PCP values for some aggre-
gated industries. One can see that for an industry like mining, PCP is close to zero,
while the apparel industry has a PCP value close to one.
Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics. The first part include the donation-
related variables. On average, a sample firm donates 4 million of 2000 dollars to
charities in one year. The average local donation is 1.6 million, and average national
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Figure 2.2: Output Purchased by Final Consumers
Notes: This figure presents personal consumption percentage (PCP) in different industries.
PCP is calculated based the 2007 benchmark input-output data provided by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis. PCP measures the percentage of revenue that consumers contribute
to a certain industry. PCP is calculated for each BEA detailed industry (389 industries).
For this figure, PCP is aggregated to BEA summary industry (71 industries) based on
weighted average of each detailed industry with industry total output as weight. BEA
summary industries with number of 2007 Compustat firms below sample median (65 firms)
are not reported in this figure. See Section 4 and appendix for detailed PCP construction
procedures.
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donation is 2.2 million. Statistics of five main cause categories are also reported.
Education is the largest category with a mean firm-year donation of 2 million dollars,
and the second largest category is health with 1 million dollars. Firm characteristics
are reported in the second part of the table. The average sample firm has total assets
of 51.6 billion dollars and net income of 1.6 billion dollars. This is consistent with the
fact that these are large S&P 500 firms. Finally, regarding the “closeness” measure,
the average personal consumption percentage is 0.35.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics for a sample of S&P 500 firms with avail-
able data from 1994 to 2014. Donation is the total amount of a firm’s donation in a year
collected from the NOZAsearch database. The summary statistics excludes firm-year ob-
servations where there is no donation reported from NOZAsearch of that firm year. Local
donation and national donation are the amount of firm’s donation to local organizations
and national organizations, respectively. Food donation refers to donation where recipient’s
cause is food and agriculture. Environment donation refers to donation where recipient’s
cause is environment or animal-related. Education donation refers to donation where recip-
ient’s cause is education or youth development. Science donation refers to donation where
recipient’s cause is science and technology. Health donation refers to donation where re-
cipient’s cause is health care, medical research, or mental health & crisis intervention. All
donation amounts are reported in millions of 2000 U.S. dollars. Firm characteristics are
obtained from Compustat. Total assets and net incomes are in billions of 2000 U.S. dollars.
Return on equity is the ratio of net incomes to equity. Return on assets is the ratio of net
incomes to total assets. Personal consumption % calculated from BEA input-output matrix
measures the percentage of revenue that consumers contribute to the firm’s industry.
mean p50 sd p25 p75
Donation ($M)
Donation 4.08 1.13 9.12 0.32 3.76
Local donation 1.58 0.27 4.46 0.00 1.20
National donation 2.24 0.50 5.79 0.09 1.94
Food donation 0.08 0.00 0.74 0.00 0.00
Environment donation 0.14 0.00 0.94 0.00 0.00
Education donation 2.05 0.45 4.79 0.00 1.94
Science donation 0.13 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.00
Health donation 1.02 0.00 4.45 0.00 0.42
Firm
Total assets ($B) 51.59 15.28 128.46 6.06 36.16
Net incomes ($B) 1.57 0.68 2.72 0.28 1.61
Personal consumption % 0.35 0.32 0.33 0.03 0.54
Observations 3,734
2.5.2 Test 1
The regression results of the first test is reported in Table 2.2. The dependent
variable is donation, and the key independent variable is PCP. Firm characteristics
and industry characteristics are added as additional controls. I also add time fixed
effects and state fixed effects to absorb any time or location trend. 9 In the first
column, I include all donations made by firm-years, and this gives me a sample size of
3,734. The key variable PCP is significant at 10% level, weakly supporting my “image
gain through closeness” story. The second column, however, only includes those
9I do not add industry fixed effects because the key variable PCP is at industry level.
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donations made on a local scale, and the third only national ones. The differentiation
between local and national donations is based on the conjecture that donations are
more observable by consumers on a local level, so firms might have higher incentive to
donate on a local scale to attract local consumers using a good local image. Indeed,
the variable PCP is significant at 5% level when only local donations are considered.
The coefficient is 0.535, which can be translated into an increase of 0.176 million
dollars of donations, when personal consumption percentage goes up by a standard
deviation (0.33). This increase is about 11% of the mean local donations as reported
in Table 2.1. However, for national donations, PCP is insignificant as shown in column
3. This result supports the conjecture that a firm responds more to “closeness” with
local donations instead of national ones due to observability of local donations by
consumers.
In column 4, I include not only firm-years with positive donation amount, but
also those firms that donated a positive amount in at least one, but not necessarily
all years. As a results, I get a larger sample size. For a firm that donated in some
years but not others, there is the concern that the zero-donations are not actually
zeros, but rather missing entries in the NOZAsearch database. As a result, I use
column 1 with positive donations only as the benchmark regression and add column
4 as a robustness check. The coefficients in the two columns do not appear to be
significantly different. And for column 5, I include all the S&P 500 firms, regardless
of whether they make donations at all. One can interpret the first column as focusing
on the intensive margin of donations given that a firm donates in a given year, while
the last column is more about the extensive margin. In the last column, the variable
PCP is not significant when the extensive margin is also considered.
The control variable size, which is the natural log of total assets, is significant at
1% level in all five specifications. This is consistent with the intuition that larger
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Table 2.2: Closeness and Donation
Notes: The table presents OLS regression of firm donation on industry personal consump-
tion percentage. The sample consists of S&P 500 firms with available data from 1994 to
2014. The dependent variable in columns (1), (4) and (5) is firm’s total donation in a year.
The dependent variable in columns (2) and (3) is local donation and national donation,
respectively. Columns (1) to (3) only include firm-year observations where firm’s total do-
nation in that year is not zero. Column (4) further includes firm-years where firm’s donation
in that year is zero, but the firm has denoted at least once during the entire sample period.
Column (5) includes all firm-years. Personal consumption % is the percentage of revenue
that consumers contribute to the firm’s industry. Size is the logarithm of firm’s total assets.
Net incomes is the logarithm of firm’s net income. Industry size is the logarithm of the
total assets of the NAICS industry which the firm belongs to. Industry Herfindahl is the
Herfindahl index based on sales. Commercial bank is a dummy variable which equals 1 if
the firm is a commercial bank. Year and state fixed effects are included in all columns.
Standard errors reported in the parentheses are robust and two-way clustered by industry
and year. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Donation Local National Donation Donation
Donation Donation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Personal consumption % 1.9978∗ 0.5708∗∗ 0.9742 1.3789∗ 0.9893
(1.0811) (0.2730) (0.6655) (0.8108) (0.6585)
Size 1.4900∗∗∗ 0.5902∗∗∗ 0.7611∗∗∗ 0.9085∗∗∗ 0.7405∗∗∗
(0.3297) (0.1616) (0.1559) (0.2076) (0.1769)
Net incomes 0.2143∗ 0.0494∗ 0.1192∗ 0.1759∗∗ 0.1552∗∗
(0.1109) (0.0299) (0.0693) (0.0866) (0.0768)
Industry size -0.0780 0.0205 -0.0790 0.1053 0.1296
(0.2335) (0.1090) (0.1177) (0.1328) (0.1125)
Industry Herfindahl 0.1407 0.4115 -0.0843 0.6679 1.0146
(1.2470) (0.4344) (0.7571) (0.8310) (0.6988)
Commercial Bank -0.2198 0.7270∗∗∗ -0.8450 -0.0359 0.0834
(0.8281) (0.2695) (0.5363) (0.5428) (0.6068)
Time fixed effects X X X X X
State fixed effects X X X X X
Observations 3,734 3,734 3,734 5,874 7,123
Adjusted R2 0.2313 0.2278 0.1835 0.2029 0.1750
firms should donate more to charities. The indicator variable commercial bank is
significant at 1% when only local donations are used. In all other specifications,
commercial bank is insignificant. This confirms the fact that banks are required to
support their local communities. The results in the “closeness” regression provides
some evidence that firms care about their public image perceived by consumers, as
firms that are “closer” to consumers donate more to public goods, especially reflected
in local donations that are more visible.
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2.5.3 Test 2
In the second test, I use the donation cause information provided by NOZAsearch
to test to see whether firms tend to donate to causes that are related to their indus-
tries. I divide all donations into six cause categories, food, environment, education,
science, health, and others. A fractional multinomial logit model is used to charac-
terize firm’s decision of what percentage of donation it puts into each category. The
others category is omitted in the regression. Regarding firm characteristics, I consider
three industry dummies, food industry, high-tech industry, and medical industry, as
these are the industries that have clear connection to some of the cause categories.
Since explanatory variables are time invariant, I also construct donation percentage
at firm level rather than firm-year level. 10 The sample I arrive at has 405 firms.
Table 2.3 Panel A reports the regression coefficients. For firms in the food indus-
try, the coefficient for the food category is significant at 1% level and has a magnitude
larger than the coefficients for all remaining categories. This means that food compa-
nies are significantly more likely to donate to the food cause. 11 For high-tech firms,
the coefficient for the science category is highly significant and has a magnitude larger
than other coefficients. So high-tech firms has a higher tendency to donate to the
science cause among all causes. The coefficient for education is also significant at 1%,
but the magnitude is not the largest among all coefficients. This can be interpreted
as high-tech firms donates more to the education cause than at least the omitted
“others” category. And for medical firms, the coefficient for the health category is
10Using firm-year donation as dependent variable and clustering standard errors at firm-year level
yield the same results.
11For multinomial logit models, an increase in explanatory variable x leads to an increase in
dependent variable category yi if βx,i is larger than βx,j for any j 6= i.
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highly significant and largest in magnitude, so medical firms has a tendency to donate
to the health cause among all causes. 12
In Panel B of Table 2.3, I report the marginal effects translated from the regression
coefficients. The last line in the panel means that an average firm would allocate 2%
of its donations to the food cause, 3% to environment, 41% to education, 2% to
science, 18% to health, and 34% to other categories. The first marginal effect of
0.0621 means that a food company on average allocates 8.21% of its total donations
to the food cause as compared to 2% of an average firm. For high-tech firms, the
coefficients in Panel A are significant for both education and science causes. Their
marginal effects show that high-tech firms donate 49.25% to education and 4.51% to
science, significantly higher than an average firm. And for medical firms, they donate
significantly more to the health category–46.94% as compared to 18% of an average
firm.
The fractional multinomial logit results suggest that there exists some connection
between the firm’s line of business and the cause they like to donate to. The un-
derlying reason might be an image one. For example, people who consume a lot of
medical products are more likely to be people with health problems. These are also
likely to be the people who pay more attention to medical research, health care is-
sues, and donations made for these purposes. So the image effect would also be larger
for these consumers. Hence, it makes sense for medical firms to donate more to the
health cause in order to attract customers. However, there could also be other reasons
causing this donation pattern. For example, a high-tech firm that donates more to
education and science categories might see the donations as long-term investments
and expect future gains through higher human capital and knowledge spillovers. If
12The health cause also include medical researches. For more detailed description of the cause
categories, please refer to the notes of Table 2.1.
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this is true, then there seems to exist some complementarity between a firm’s line of
business and donations that might increase firm profits in the long term. This kind of
complementarity is not explored in this paper, but could be an interesting direction
for future research on corporate giving.
2.6 Conclusion
Charitable giving, due to its visibility and measurability, does not only enhance a
firm’s social image directly, but also conveys a credible message of the firm’s overall
level of social responsibility, which might be hidden from or hard to measure for the
consumers. Consumers, even though self-interested, would still prefer to purchase
products from firms that seem “nicer.” In this case, it is profit-maximizing for firms to
donate money to charities in order to attract consumers. In a separating equilibrium,
a high responsibility firm donates not only more than the low responsibility firm,
but also more than the case when information is symmetric. This indicates that
asymmetric information is a source of inefficiency for the firms. But the overdonation
of the high type leads to a higher level of total corporate donation, resulting in higher
consumer welfare. And if consumers care a lot about corporate social responsibility,
corporate donation will be really high, and this will mitigate the free-riding problem
of the consumers, leading to even higher consumer welfare. So in a sense, information
asymmetry, a source of inefficiency for the firms, counteracts the inefficiency with
public good, and leads to a higher level of social welfare.
The channels to attract consumers should only work for firms that sell directly
to consumers. Hence, I use donation data to show that firms in final consumption
good industries donate more than firms in intermediate good industries. However, as
mentioned, there must exist other potential reasons for profit-driven firms to donate
to charities, such as complementarity between the business and a charitable cause.
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If this is the case, then the outcome on public good provision and consumer welfare
might be positive as well, and could be interesting to explore.
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Table 2.3: Industry and Donation Category
Notes: The table presents the coefficients and marginal effects from a fractional multinomial
logit model of firm’s industry on firm’s donation category. The sample consists of S&P
500 firms with available data. Firm’s donations are classified into six categories: food,
environment, education, science, health, and others. See Table 2.1 for category definition.
The dependent variable is the fraction of a firm’s donation in each of these six categories
during the entire sample period. The independent variables are three dummies. Food equals
1 if firm’s NAICS code is in 11, 311, 312, 445, or 722. High-tech equals 1 if firm’s NAICS
code is in 32411, 325, 33299, 3331-3333, 3336, 3339, 3353, 33599, 3361-3364, 3391, 334,
5112, 518, 519, 5413, 5415-5417, or 8812. Medical equals 1 if firm’s NAICS code is in 3254,
3391, or 621-624. Panel A reports the coefficients of the fractional multinomial logit model.
*,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Panel B reports
the change in donation fractions if a firm changes from not in food, high-tech and medical
industry to food industry, high-tech industry or medical industry, respectively. The last
row of Panel B reports the average donation fraction in each category for all sample firms.
Panel A: Fractional Multinomial Logit Model
Donation Categories (Other Category Omitted)
Food Environment Education Science Health
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Food 2.0662∗∗∗ 0.7759∗ 0.5207∗ 0.0983 0.3939
(0.4394) (0.4263) (0.2662) (0.6168) (0.3347)
High-tech 0.1310 0.2488 0.4166∗∗∗ 1.7060∗∗∗ 0.0359
(0.7156) (0.3101) (0.1616) (0.3890) (0.2292)
Medical -1.6577∗∗ 0.7888 0.2769 -1.5276∗∗ 1.5592∗∗∗
(0.8236) (0.8106) (0.4288) (0.5931) (0.4382)
Constant -3.2983∗∗∗ -2.5723∗∗∗ -0.0132 -3.9674∗∗∗ -0.7838∗∗∗
(0.2648) (0.1697) (0.0996) (0.3203) (0.1149)
Observations 405
Model χ2 138.00
Panel B: Marginal Effects
Food Environment Education Science Health Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Food 0.0621 0.0138 0.0521 -0.0019 0.0000 -0.1262
High-tech -0.0012 0.0001 0.0825 0.0251 -0.0300 -0.0771
Medical -0.0128 0.0065 -0.1033 -0.0065 0.2894 -0.1733
Category average 0.02 0.03 0.41 0.02 0.18 0.34
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Chapter 3
CRIME RATE, HOUSING PRICE, AND VALUE OF A STATISTICAL CASE OF
HOMICIDE
3.1 Introduction
Crime could be a life-threatening issue and it is hard for individuals to fight crime.
As a result, societies usually rely on the government to provide public safety as a
local public good. However, the amount of money a local government should spend
on reducing crime is difficult to measure. The most challenging task in the cost and
benefit analysis is to estimate people’s willingness to pay for a safer neighborhood.
The revealed preference method and the property hedonic model are commonly used
to estimate the marginal willingness to pay for a change in the level of local public
goods, such as environmental quality (e.g., Kiel and McClain, 1995; Leggett and
Bockstael, 2000; Chay and Greenstone, 2005). These methods can similarly be used
in the study of crime. In this paper, we use the hedonic approach to explore the
relationship between changes in crime rate during the 1990s and changes in housing
price during that period. We then translate the estimates into people’s willingness to
pay for a reduction in violent crime.
During the 1990s, crime rate dropped sharply and unexpectedly among all cat-
egories of crime and across all parts of the United States (Levitt, 2004, Pope and
Pope, 2012). According to data by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, from 1991 to
2000, the violent crime rate plunged by 33% percent and the property crime rate by
30%. Similar trends can also be observed in any other categories of the crime. These
declines were largely unexpected and experts actually predicted an explosion in crime
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rate for the 1990s (Levitt, 2004). Although it must interest researchers a lot to look
for the causes of the decline, we believe it is also worthwhile to look at the effect side
of it.
Some early papers study the relationship between crime rate and housing price
using cross sectional data (Thaler, 1978; Lynch and Rasmussen, 2001; Gibbons, 2004).
More recently, researchers exploit temporal changes in crime rate and use panel data
with fixed effects to control for unobservable time-invariant factors. For example,
Linden and Rockoff (2008) and Pope (2008) study how move-ins of a sex offender affect
the housing prices in Montgomery County, Ohio and Hillsborough County, Florida,
respectively. Both papers find a negative relation between crime risk and property
values, but the results pertain to the specific counties and to the one particular type
of crime. In a more recent study by Pope and Pope (2012), they use data from
3,000 zip codes in five states and find the elasticity of property value with respect to
crime to range from −0.15 to −0.35 by exploring the 1990s crime drop. Our paper
shares some features with Pope and Pope (2012), in the sense that we also use the
1990s crime drop to find the effects on housing price. However, we believe that our
study also brings some new features to the existing literature from at least the three
following aspects.
First, we use a more comprehensive measure of crime as compared to earlier
studies and consider a different instrumental variable from the one used in Pope and
Pope (2012). The instrument we use is the state level abortion rate in the 1970s
and 1980s as an instrument for MSA level crime rates in the 1990s. The validity of
the instrument is based on the 10- to 20-year gap between the abortion rate and the
housing price. The relevance of our instrument is proposed by Donohue and Levitt
(2001), in which they argue that the unexpected crime rate drop in 1990s was largely
driven by the legalization of abortion in 1970s. We find a large F-statstics from the
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first stage regression, which suggests that the instrument is strong judged by the
criteria suggested in Bound et al. (1995).
Second, in almost all empirical papers in the hedonic literature, the hedonic func-
tion is assumed to be stable. But such assumption does not necessarily hold. Kuminoff
and Pope (2014) point out that as the level of a public good changes (absence of crime
in our case), the gradient of the hedonic function should also change. They argue
that if one ignores the evolution of the coefficients, the estimate of the traditional
“capitalization” effect does not necessarily say anything about people’s true marginal
willingness to pay. In our paper, we explicitly take into account the evolution of the
coefficients by estimating a fixed effects model with time-varying coefficients.
Third, we obtain an estimate for the value of a statistical case of homicide, which
is an estimate of people’s willingness to pay to avoid one expected case of homicide.
Since our crime data contain seven categories: murder and nonnegligent manslaugh-
ter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravate assault, burglary, larceny theft, and motor theft,
we translate the marginal willingness to pay for fewer cases of murder and nonnegli-
gent manslaughter into a value of a statistical case of homicide. 1 To do so, we first
create a crime index based on the method proposed by Sellin and Wolfgang (1964),
then use the index as the crime variable in the regression, and finally translate the
estimated coefficient into a value of a statistical case of homicide. Based on our pre-
ferred model specification, we find that people’s willingness to pay for avoiding a case
of homicide is about 0.4 million dollars.
1Technically, homicide contains not only murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, but also other
cases such as accident killing of a man. However, to simplify language, we use the term “value of a
statistical case of homicide”.
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3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data Sources
We use data from four different sources. We collect the annual MSA level crime
rate in all categories from Uniform Crime Report (UCR) published by the FBI. We
obtain the annual MSA level housing data from the Housing Price Index (HPI) pub-
lished by the Federal Housing Financing Agency (FHFA). Other annual MSA level
demographic characteristics such as population and income are gathered and derived
from IPUMS CPS. Finally, we obtain the state level abortion rate in 1970s and 1980s
from the Guttmacher Institute.
We collect the annual MSA level crime rate from 1992 to 2000 from FBI’s Uniform
Crime Report (UCR). The years 1990 and 1991 are excluded from the regression
because the crime rate was still increasing in the year 1990 following the trend in the
1980s, and also because it might take some time for people to realize the decrease
and update their beliefs in the crime rate. The FBI gather and release the crime data
based on reports from local law enforcement agencies through UCR annually. The
data is an unbalanced panel because there is a deadline for the local agencies to report
their annual crime data and some agencies miss the deadline from year to year. FBI
divides crime into seven categories: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible
rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft.
The first four types of crime are categorized into violent crimes while the last three
are considered as property crimes. Even though we attempt to derive a value of a
statistical case of homicide, we do not want to consider murder as the only type of
crime in our regression, because not controlling for other types of crime could lead
to omitted variable bias and inflate the coefficient on murder. Neither do we want
to include all categories as separate variables since most types of crimes are highly
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correlated. So we compose all categories into one crime variable. However, not all
categories of crime should be given the same weight, because, for example, murder is
obviously more serious than theft. Therefore, we adopt the methodology suggested by
Sellin and Wolfgang (1964) and calculate a weighted crime index based on the severity
of the offenses. According to that method, a one unit increase in the homicide rate
(per 100,000 people) increases the index by 26 units, which is approximately 13 times
bigger than the contribution of a one unit increase in larceny theft.
Sellin and Wolfgang published The Measurement of Delinquency in 1964, in which
they develop a method to measure the seriousness of different types of crimes. The
method allowed researchers to better understand the “qualitative elements in criminal
behavior”, according to Wellford and Wiatrowski (1975) in a work following Sellin and
Wolfgang. In their original work, Sellin and Wolfgang made a list of 141 cases of crime
and asked various judges such as university students to rate the seriousness of all the
cases. From the rating of the judges, Sellin and Wolfgang created the scale of offense
seriousness that is adopted in this paper. The seven categories of crime are given the
following weights: murder and nonnegligent manslaughter (26.4), forcible rape (14.7),
robbery (4.6), aggravated assault (5), burglary (2.4), larceny-theft (2.1), and motor
vehicle theft (3.1). The Sellin and Wolfgang scale is replicated by various studies in
different parts of the world (e.g., Normandeau, 1966; Velez-Diaz and Megargee, 1970;
Hsu, 1973), and the replication studies mostly prove the Sellin and Wolfgang scale to
be reliable (Wellford and Wiatrowski, 1975).
The MSA level housing prices are recorded from Federal Housing Financing Agency’s
Housing Price Index and range from 1994 to 2002. The time scopes of the data on
housing price and crime are slightly different because we assume there is a time lag
between the decline in crime rate and its effect on housing price. The HPI is a broad
measure of the price movement of single-family detached properties. Based on the
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data on conforming mortgage transactions obtained from the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) and the Federal National Mortgage Associa-
tion (Fannie Mae), FHFA estimates and publishes quarterly average price changes
in repeat sales or refinancings on the same properties. The estimation is based on
a modified version of the weighted-repeat sales methodology proposed by Case and
Shiller (1989). We use the MSA level data downloadable from the FHFA’s website
and convert the quarterly data into annual data by taking an unweighted average (the
results are almost identical if we take a weighted average based on the standard devi-
ation of the estimates). To convert the price index into dollar values and to calculate
the value of a statistical case of homicide, we use the MSA level median housing prices
from 2000 census provided by National Historical Geographic Information System.
We also use data on demographics as control variables. They include household
income, age structure, education level, race composition, housing ownership, poverty
and unemployment rate. Since the census only provides demographic data on 2000
and our estimation is based on annual MSA level data, we derive those information
from Current Population Survey. We collect individual demographic characteristics
from March CPS through IPUMS and then convert them into aggregated MSA level
demographic information by using the weight suggested by the CPS.
Finally, we collect state level abortion rates in the 1970s and 1980s from the
Guttmacher Institute. Abortion was legalized in the United States after 1973, so
we are unable to find information on abortion rate before that year. To construct
an instrument for a given MSA in a given year, we calculate an annual state level
effective abortion rate based on the formula suggested in Donohue and Levitt (2001).
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3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 3.1 presents the trend in national crime index from 1992 to 2000. The
index is calculated as the average of MSAs by using the Sellin and Wolfgang method.
On average, crime declined dramatically over the period, with the index falling from
the highest value of 15,581 in 1992 to the lowest value of 11,681 in 2000. If we only
look at MSAs with crime index in 1992 above the 75th percentile of the sample,
the plunge becomes even bigger. If we instead look at MSAs with low initial crime
index, the drop is milder. A similar trend can also be observed if we instead use the
unweighted index or any single category. These observations suggest that our data
provide enough variations both across time and between MSAs in the key explanatory
variable to identify the effect of crime on property value.
Figure 3.1: Crime Index from 1992 to 2000
Notes: The index is calculated as the average of MSAs in the sample and by using the Sellin
and Wolfgang’s weighting function. MSAs with high (low) initial crime rate are defined as
MSAs whose crime index in 1992 is above (below) the 75th (25th) percentile of the sample.
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics on variables that we use in the subsequent
regressions. The means are calculated as the averages across MSAs used in the pri-
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mary regressions. The monetary figures are denoted in 1999 dollars. During 1992
to 2000, the mean of MSA’s housing price index (adjusted for inflation) increased
roughly by 12%, whereas crime index decreased by 25%. Income per household rose
approximately by 5%, unemployment rate decreased by 3%, and the population was
12% higher at the end of the period. The increase in education attainment is evident:
3% increase in high school attainment and 4% increase for college. The race compo-
sition, poverty rate and housing ownership are roughly constant at the beginning and
the end of the period.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Notes: All values in the table are averages across MSAs used in the primary regressions.
For HPI, the first quarter of 1995 is set as the benchmark and is assigned the number of
100. The MSA HPIs in the table are adjusted by the inflation.
Mean 1992 2000
Housing price index 108.19 120.73
Crime index 15580.51 11680.97
Income per household (1999) 43983.4 46294.2
Population 642873 720947
Unemployment rate 0.08 0.05
% high school graduate 0.81 0.84
% college graduate 0.21 0.24
% white 0.86 0.85
% poverty 0.13 0.12
% owned house 0.68 0.69
3.3 Empirical Methodology
3.3.1 Fixed Effects Hedonic Model
We use hedonic regressions with MSA level panel data to estimate the effect of
crime on housing price. The hedonic approach is originally developed as an individual-
level model, but the aggregation to lower resolution level is common in the literature.
(For instance, Chay and Greenstone (2005) consider the county level aggregation and
use the hedonic model to estimate the effect of air quality on housing price.)
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The model estimated is as follows:
pi,t = βtCrimei,t−1 + γXi,t−1 + αi + λt + εi,t ,
where pi,t is the median housing price in MSA i at time t, Crimei,t−1 is the key
variable of interest, Xi,t−1 is the set of demographic control variables, αi is the MSA
fixed effect, λt is the national time dummy, and εi,t the idiosyncratic error term.
To reduce measurement error in crime and other demographic characteristics, we
combine the data of two adjacent years to generate one time period. Hence, we have
five periods in the panel. We assume that there is a one period lag between the
realized crime rate and its effect on the housing price.
One difference between our estimation strategy and the traditional hedonic model
is that we allow the coefficient βt to be varying over time. The interpretation of the
coefficients in the hedonic regression is people’s marginal willingness to pay (MWTP)
for the local public good (absence of crime in our case). However, MWTP does not
necessarily stay constant as time goes on and as the level of public good provision
changes. Therefore, if one ignores the evolution in the gradients, the hedonic model
is not correctly specified and hence the estimate might not be the true MWTP (Ku-
minoff and Pope, 2014).
3.3.2 Instrumental Variable
In the above estimation equation, even though we include MSA fixed effects to ab-
sorb time constant unobservable effects, there might still exist some unobservable time
varying factors that influence both crime and housing price. For instance, suppose
a local government carries out a policy to provide housing subsidies for households
with low income, then such policy might reduce the crime rate because low income
families could potentially invest more time and money in their children and keep them
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away from violence and crime. At the same time, housing subsidies could also have
an impact on the local housing market through raising demand. If this is the case
and we do not include the policy as an explanatory variable, the OLS estimation will
give an upward biased result. Therefore, we find it necessary to use an instrumental
variable for crime to address the potential endogeneity issue.
We are not the first to propose the usage of an instrument. In the study by Pope
and Pope (2012), they use a zip code with similar initial crime rate as an instrument
for crime in a target zip code. However, we think the validity of such instrument
might be questionable. Suppose one uses a zip code in California as the instrument
for a zip code in New York because the two zip codes have the same initial crime level,
and a national policy was carried out to improve school quality in these areas. Since
school quality might affect young people’s tendency to commit crime, the change in
crime rate in the California zip code could be related to the increase in school quality
in the New York zip code and have an effect on its housing price. Hence, if such
national policies are not controlled, the validity of the instrument is violated.
The instrument we implement in this paper is the state level abortion rate in the
1970s and 1980s, based on Donohue and Levitt (2001). The U.S. Supreme Court’s Roe
v. Wade decision in 1973 announced the legalization of abortion. After 1973, there
was a significant increase in abortion rates in almost all states across the country.
Such trend continued until the beginning of 1980s and was then followed by a steady
decrease throughout the 1980s and 1990s.
We argue for the validity of the instrument based on the time lag between the
abortion data and the housing data. The abortion data we use are from the 1970s
and 1980s and the housing price data are from the 1990s, so there is at least a 10
year gap between the two. The argument for the relevance of the instrument is based
on two premises: unwanted children have a higher risk for crime and legalization
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of abortion reduces the number of unwanted birth. Such argument is proposed and
verified in Donohue and Levitt (2001). They find a statistically significant negative
relation between abortion rates in the 1970s and early 1980s and crime rates in the
1990s. However, Christopher L. Foote and Christopher F. Goetz point out that there
is a coding error in the last model specification in Donohue and Levitt (2001) and
question the endogeneity issue in all their regressions. But we think these issues do not
affect our study for two reasons. First, Donohue and Levitt (2001) use five different
approaches, all of which point out the same relation between abortion and crime.
Foote and Goetz only found an error in the last approach, while our IV is mainly
based on the fourth approach. Secondly, even if Donohue and Levitt (2001) overlook
other factors that are correlated with abortion in 1970s and are determinants of crime
rates in the 1990s, the relevance of our instrument only depends on correlation rather
than causation, so we think it is not a big issue, either. We also look at the F-statistics
from the first stage regression, and the results show that the abortion rate is a strong
instrument for the crime.
To generate the instrument for crime rate at a given year t, we adopt the idea of
the “effective abortion rate” in Donohue and Levitt (2001), which is the average of
abortion rate across all cohorts of arrestees weighted by the cohort’s share in the pop-
ulation of arrestees, i.e., Eff Abortiont =
∑
aAbortiont−a(Arrestsa/Arreststotal).
The youngest group we consider is the cohort at age of 10; the oldest is the one at
age of 19. We only consider people of younger age because we want to exclude the
main group of home buyers. And excluding adult arrestees does not undermine the
strength of the IV. To illustrate the construction of the effective abortion rate, taking
year 1992 as an example, we consider the cohorts with age of 10 to 19 in that year,
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and correspondingly use the abortion rate from year 1973 to year 1982. 2 We use
the three year national average arrest data in 1981 to 1983 from the Uniform Crime
Reports to compute the weighting function and use it for all states. We then use
the effective abortion rate as the instrument for the crime index and estimate the
following equation:
pi,t = βtCrimei,t−1(Eff Abortiont) + γXi,t−1 + αi + λt + εi,t .
The results from this equation are our preferred estimates.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Estimation Results
Table 3.2 presents the OLS estimation results of the fixed effects hedonic model
without the instrumental variable. Column 1 and column 3 only include the crime
index and time dummies; column 2 and column 4 add demographic control variables.
Estimates in columns 1 and 2 are the conventional capitalization effects, i.e. assuming
the coefficients are stable; columns 3 and 4 allow the coefficient of the crime index
in periods 4 and 5 to be different from that in periods 1 to 3. These four model
specifications are also used in Table 3.4. There are two points to mention about our
choice of the time-varying coefficients. First, ideally, we could generate interaction
terms between the time dummy and the crime rate and estimate the coefficient on
crime for all 5 periods separately; however, by doing so we would create too many
interaction terms, which deteriorates the identification power of the model. Since the
crime rate decreases in a stable trend throughout our data period, we think it is a
natural way to cut the total time span in half. Second, we do not allow the coefficients
2The arrests are also divided into seven categories, and we use the same method to create the
effective abortion rate index as used in weighted crime index.
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of other control variables to change over time due to the same consideration for
identification power. Our reasoning behind this is quite similar to what researchers
usually do with regard to the endogeneity issue. Although endogeneity of any variable
could lead to biased estimates for all coefficients, in reality, people often only address
the endogeneity of the key variable of interest. Similarly, although varying coefficients
on other variables could lead to biased coefficient on crime, we only regard it as a
second order issue.
Table 3.2: Estimates of the Impact of Crime on Housing Price by Fixed Effects
Hedonic Model
Notes: The control variables used in columns (2) and (4) include all demographic controls
mentioned above in equation (1). Here, we only present the coefficients on population
size and household income because these two coefficients are statistically significant. For
columns (3) and (4), we assume different coefficients on crime for period 1 to 3 and period
4 to 5. The last row shows the difference between the coefficients for different periods. The
numbers in the parenthesis are cluster robust standard errors. *,**,*** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime index (×105) -0.8352∗∗∗ -0.6083∗∗∗
(0.2203) (0.2126)
Crime index (period 1) (×105) -0.8517∗∗∗ -0.6079∗∗∗
(0.2205) (0.2143)
Crime index (period 2) (×105) -1.1314∗∗∗ -0.9458∗∗∗
(0.2589) (0.2496)
Household income (×105) 0.2127∗∗∗ 0.2085∗∗∗
(0.0587) (0.0577)
Population (×105) 0.0158∗∗∗ 0.0173∗∗∗
(0.0051) (0.0049)
Unemployment rate -0.0747 -0.0606
(0.1131) (0.1109)
Poverty % -0.0245 -0.0476
(0.0706) (0.0716)
Old people % -0.0335 -0.0268
(0.0678) (0.0679)
High school graduate % -0.2081∗∗∗ -0.2118∗∗∗
(0.0702) (0.0689)
College graduate % 0.0565 0.0573
(0.0498) (0.0491)
White % -0.0402 -0.0389
(0.0531) (0.0528)
Owned house % -0.0192 -0.0195
(0.0446) (0.0445)
Other demographic controls No Yes No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,023 1,023 1,023 1,023
Adjusted R2 0.843 0.853 0.845 0.855
Difference of coefficients on crime index 0.280∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.112) (0.103)
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The results in column 1 show that if the crime index decreases by 1 unit, the
housing price will increase by 8.35 × 10−6%. Adding more demographic controls
reduces the elasticity to 6.08× 10−6.
Although the estimates in columns 1 and 2 are reasonable in terms of their signs,
they could be biased because we ignore the potential change in coefficients over time.
Columns 3 and 4 investigate such possibility. The results show that if we allow
the coefficients to change over time, the elasticity in the later period is larger than
that in the earlier period. Furthermore, the t-test result indicates that the increase
in elasticity is statistically significant at 5% level. Therefore, it is problematic to
interpret the conventional capitalization effect in column 1 and 2 as people’s MWTP
and to use them to conduct welfare analysis.
However, even though the fixed effects model in Table 3.2 controls for the time
constant unobservable MSA characteristics, the crime index could still suffer from
the endogeneity issue if there exist some unobservable time varying factors that in-
fluence both crime and housing price. To address this issue, we use the fixed effects
instrumental variable model. Table 3.3 provides the first stage results for the model
specifications without and with demographic controls, respectively. As expected, the
effective abortion rate is negatively correlated with crime rate. Furthermore, the F-
statistic testing the hypothesis that the coefficient on effective abortion rate equals
zero is very high, indicating that the instrument is very strong. These results do
not change if we add demographic control variables. Hence, based on the first stage
results and the results from Donohue and Levitt (2001), it is safe to say that our
instrumental variable does not suffer from the weak instrument problem.
Table 3.4 presents the main results in our paper. Column 1 shows that a one unit
decrease in the crime index leads to a significant 2.88×10−5% increase in the median
housing price. This estimated elasticity is about 4 times larger than the one suggested
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Table 3.3: First Stage Results of Fixed Effects Instrumental Variable Hedonic Model
Notes: The numbers are the first stage results of the two stage least square estimation
of Table 3.4. The last column shows the F-statistic used to check whether the effective
abortion rate suffers from the weak instrument problem. The numbers in the parenthesis
are cluster robust standard errors. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Effective abortion rate -6.53∗∗∗ -5.83∗∗∗
(0.96) (0.92)
Other demographic controls No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes
Sample size 1023 1023
R2 0.06 0.00
F-stat 45.81 39.80
in Table 3.2. The elasticity slightly reduces to 2.64× 10−5 when we add demographic
controls in column 2. To investigate whether people’s MWTP for the reduction in
crime changes over time, we again consider the time varying coefficients model in
columns 3 and 4. The results show that the elasticity is slightly lower in the later
periods than in the earlier periods, but the difference is not statistically significant,
unlike the case shown in OLS estimations. However, the lower coefficient in the
later period seems to point toward the intuition that when crime rate becomes lower,
people’s MWTP for a further reduction in crime also becomes lower as compared to
when crime rate is higher. And even though the difference between the two periods
are not significant, we still think the exercise in columns 3 and 4 is valuable, because
we take the potential evolution into account. If there were any evolution in people’s
MWTP, our method would allow us to identify it.
3.4.2 Interpretations of Economic Magnitude
In this section, we use the instrumental variable regression results in Table 3.4 to
interpret the economic magnitude of our findings, i.e., people’s marginal willingness
to pay (MWTP) for changes in crime risk. We take on two exercises as follows.
First, we compare our results on the effect of crime on housing price with the ones in
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Table 3.4: Estimates of the Impact of Crime on Housing Price by Fixed Effects
Instrumental Variable Hedonic Model
Notes: See notes for Table 3.2. The numbers in the parenthesis are cluster robust standard
errors. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crime index(×105) -2.8795∗∗∗ -2.6358∗∗∗
(0.4865) (0.5423)
Crime index (period 1) (×105) -2.9307∗∗∗ -2.6814∗∗∗
(0.5419) (0.6561)
Crime index (period 2) (×105) -2.8048∗∗∗ -2.5987∗∗∗
(0.6396) (0.6292)
Household income (×105) 0.2331∗∗∗ 0.2346∗∗∗
(0.0614) (0.0631)
Population (×105) 0.0027 0.0021
(0.0053) (0.0075)
Unemployment rate 0.0024 0.0007
(0.1088) (0.1107)
Poverty % 0.0390 -0.0460
(0.0748) (0.0947)
Old people % -0.0428 -0.0447
(0.0797) (0.0818)
High school graduate % -0.1567∗∗ -0.1547∗∗
(0.0698) (0.0723)
College graduate % 0.0799 0.0802
(0.0605) (0.0611)
White % -0.0258 -0.0258
(0.0534) (0.0528)
Owned house % -0.0283 -0.0285
(0.0455) (0.0459)
Other demographic controls No Yes No Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
MSA dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sample size 1023 1023 1023 1023
R2 0.36 0.41 0.36 0.41
Difference of coefficients on crime index -0.126 -0.827
(0.639) (0.673)
Pope and Pope (2012). Then, we further use these results to calculate the value of a
statistical case of homicide.
We can calculate people’s MWTP for a reduction in a certain type of crime by
finding the effect of that type of crime on housing price, holding all other types of
crime constant. For example, to calculate MWTP for a one-unit decrease in homicide
risk, we first translate a one-unit decrease in homicide into a 26.4-unit decrease in the
crime index based on the Sellin-Wolfgang weight, then use the regression coefficient
of the crime index to calculate the effect on housing price, and finally use the sample
average housing price to calculate the dollar value of avoiding a statistical case of
homicide.
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It might be useful to notice that for our above method to correctly capture the
MWTP for a reduction in crime risk, the relative weights of different crime categories
in Sellin-Wolfgang’s crime index need to be equal to people’s actual perception of
seriousness for different types of crime as reflected in housing prices. The following
simplified example can illustrate why such condition is necessary. Suppose there are
only two types of crime, homicide and robbery, and housing price is affected by these
two crimes based on the HP = β1Homicide + β2Robbery + ε. The crime index is
formed as Crime = α1Homicide+ α2Robbery. Homicide and robbery are related as
Homicide = γRobbery+ξ. In this case, the true MWTP for homicide risk is reflected
by β1. However, if homicide and robbery are highly correlated, then in practice, it is
rarely possible to include both homicide and robbery in the housing price regression
and identify them separately. One potential way to address this issue is to regress
housing price on the crime index, which yields the coefficient β1+β2γ
α1+α2γ
. Then, a one-unit
change in homicide results in an α1-unit change in the crime index, and an α1
β1+β2γ
α1+α2γ
-
unit change in housing price. If the weights of homicide and robbery in the crime
index equal their effects on housing price, i.e., α1/α2 = β1/β2, then α1
β1+β2γ
α1+α2γ
= β1,
which is the true MWTP. If the relative weight of homicide in the crime index is
larger (smaller) than the relative effect of homicide on housing price, the MWTP
calculated based on our method will overestimate (underestimate) the true MWTP
to avoid homicide.
When calculating the economic magnitude of the results in Table 3.4, we also com-
pare our findings with the ones in Pope and Pope (2012). One difference between our
approach and Pope and Pope (2012) is that we classify crimes into seven categories,
while Pope and Pope only divide crimes into violent crimes and property crimes. So
in order to provide a meaningful comparison, we calculate the effect of homicide on
housing price as an upper bound for the effect of violent crime, as homicide has the
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largest Sellin-Wolfgang weight in the crime index and is clearly the most serious type
among the four types of violent crime. As for the lower bound of the effect of violent
crime, we use robbery, which has the lowest Sellin-Wolfgang weight. Similarly, we use
motor theft and larceny theft for the upper and lower bound for the effect of property
crime, respectively. We obtain the following results.
For murder, a decrease of 100 cases per 10,000 people equals to a 26,400 unit
(1, 000× 26.4, as our crime numbers are measured per 100,000 people and the weight
of homicide is 26.4) decrease in the crime index. Based on the coefficient in column
2 of Table 3.4, this is translated into a 69.7% increase in housing price. Similarly, a
decrease in robberies by 100 per 10,000 people is associated with a 12.1% increase in
housing price. As for property crimes, a decrease in motor theft and larceny theft
by 100 cases per 10,000 people result in a 8.2% and 5.5% increase in housing price,
respectively. Pope and Pope (2012) find in their study that a decrease in violent
(property) crime of 100 cases per 10,000 people is associated with an increase in
housing price of 4.3% (1.1%). So overall, our results suggest a three to five times
larger MWTP than in Pope and Pope (2012).
An additional difference between the two studies is that our crime index method
allows us to calculate the effect of one type of crime holding other types constant,
while Pope and Pope include their two types of crime in two regressions separately.
To be more specific, when calculating the effect of violent crime on housing price,
Pope and Pope (2012) regress housing price on violent crime without controlling for
property crime, so the coefficient reflects the combined effect of violent crime and
property crime.
The final step we take is to use people’s MWTP for a reduction in homicide
to calculate the value of a statistical case of homicide. Strictly speaking, homicide
contains not only murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, but also other cases such
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as accident killing of a person. However, to simplify language, we use the term “value
of a statistical case of homicide,” while it should actually be “value of a statistical
case of murder and nonnegligent manslaughter.”
Following the literature (e.g., Davis (2004)), we assume that housing price cap-
italizes the present discount value of all future homicide risk associated with living
there. We further assume that people live infinitely, discount future risk at a 5%
annual rate, and their perceived level of homicide risk in all future years equals to the
current level of homicide risk, similar to Davis (2004). Based on these assumptions, a
one-unit change in annual homicide risk is equivalent to a 21-unit change in lifetime
homicide risk. Therefore, a decrease of lifetime homicide risk by one per 10,000 is
associated with a 3.31 × 10−5 (26.4/21 × 2.64 × 10−5) increase in housing price. As
the mean housing price is $121,681 (in 1999 dollars), this means a $4.04 increase
in housing price. Since the homicide risk is measured over per 100,000 people, the
value of a statistical case of homicide is about 0.4 million dollars. This number is
lower than the value of a statistical life estimated from cancer, mortality in labor,
etc. (Gayer et al., 2000, Viscusi and Aldy, 2003, Davis, 2004). One potential reason
is that the weight of homicide relative to other crimes in Sellin-Wolfgang’s index (13
times larger than larceny theft) is smaller than the actual effect of homicide relative
to other crimes on housing price, so our method underestimates people’s MWTP to
avoid homicide. Nevertheless, the economic magnitude of our finding is still much
larger than the magnitude found in related papers studying people’s MWTP for crime
risk such as Pope and Pope (2012).
3.5 Conclusion
This paper exploited the unexpected crime plunge during the 1990s to offer an
estimate on people’s willingness to pay for a safer living environment. We collect crime
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data and housing price on annual MSA level and calculate the Sellin and Wolfgang’s
weighted crime index in order to derive a comprehensive crime variable. To control
for the potential upward bias in the fixed effect hedonic model, we use the effective
abortion rate (Donohue and Levitt, 2001) as an instrumental variable for crime using
the abortion rates in 1970s and 1980s and the age structure among arrestees. Since
the conventional capitalization effect does not necessarily reflect MWTP, we also take
into account the potential evolution of the gradients in the hedonic regression. Based
on our preferred model specification, we conclude that a one unit increase in the
crime index is associated with a 2.64 × 10−5 percent increase in the housing price.
We further convert that number into a value of a statistical case of homicide and find
people’s willingness to pay to for the homicide reduction to be around 0.4 million in
1999 dollars.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS IN CHAPTER 1
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A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. Claim: When K is sufficiently small, if open is reached, both consumers
search. Moreover, if charity type is highA, equilibrium outcome is (g∗A|A, g
∗
B|A) = (1, 0);
if charity type is highB, equilibrium outcome is (g∗A|B, g
∗
B|B) = (0, 1).
Given B searches and g∗B|A = 0, g
∗
B|B = 1,
(i) if A does not deviate, Expected Payoff (search) is: 1
2
(w − 1) + 1
2
w −K.
(ii) if A deviates to no search, the highest payoff he can get depends on the solution
to:
max
gA
1
2
(w − gA + log(gA + g∗B|A)) +
1
2
(w − gA + plog(gA + g∗B|B)) .
The solution would be gA = (p − 1 +
√
p2 − 2p+ 9)/4. Hence, Expected Payoff
(no search) is: w − gA + 12 log(gA) + 12plog(gA + 1).
Expected Payoff (search) − Expected Payoff (no search) ≈ gA − 12 − 12 log(gA) −
1
2
plog(gA + 1) − K. Therefore, when KU ≤ gA − 12 − 12 log(gA) − 12plog(gA + 1), A
would not deviate to no search.
(iii) when charity type is highA, g∗A|A = 1 maximizes A’s utility. Therefore, at
open, given B’s equilibrium strategy, A would not deviate. Since the Consumers’
problems are symmetric, given A’s equilibrium strategy, B also would not deviate.
Step 2. Claim: When K is sufficiently large, when epsilon is reached, both con-
sumers take on no search, given belief described in Proposition. Furthermore, with
ε = q+qp
2
log(2), both consumers would choose g∗i = ε.
Given consumers take on no search and g∗B = ε,
(i) if A does not deviate, Expected Payoff (no search, gA = ε) is:
1
2
(w−ε+qlog(ε+
ε)) + 1
2
(w − ε+ qplog(ε+ ε)).
(ii) if A deviates to gA = 0, Expected Payoff (no search, gA = 0) is:
1
2
(w +
qlog(ε)) + 1
2
(w + qplog(ε)).
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Expected Payoff (no search, gA = ε) ≥ Expected Payoff (no search, gA = 0) if and
only if ε ≤ q+qp
2
log(2).
The exact same argument applies to Consumer B.
Given Consumer B takes on no search and donates ε, if A deviates to search, and
if charity type is lowA, A would donate. And if charity type is lowB, A would not
donate. Hence, Expected Payoff (search) is: 1
2
(w−ε+qlog(ε+ε))+ 1
2
(w+qplog(ε))−K.
Hence, when KL ≥ q−qp
4
log(2), Expected Payoff (no search, gA = ε)≥Expected Payoff
(search).
The exact same argument applies to Consumer B. It is also checked that KL <
KU .
Step 3. Claim: Given consumers’ belief and strategy, when p ≥ 1
log(2)
−1 ≈ 0.4427,
a low type charity would choose strategy epsilon with ε∗ = q+qp
2
log(2).
If a low type deviates to open, then consumers will search and find out the charity’s
type. Then the consumer who cares more about the purpose donates δ, and the
consumer who cares less does not donate. Then the charity’s payoff, i.e. total fund
raised, is Gbad(open) = q.
If the low type does not deviate, it could raise Gbad(ε
∗) = 2ε∗ = (q+ qp)log(2). It
holds for p ≥ 1
log(2)
− 1 that Gbad(ε∗) ≥ Gbad(open).
If the low type deviates to an epsilon amount larger than q+qp
2
log(2), as shown in
Step 2, consumer would donate zero, given the other consumer donates the epsilon
amount. Since the epsilon amount cannot exceed q, the charity is better off asking for
ε∗ = q+qp
2
log(2). Moreover, it is straightforward that the low type would not choose
a smaller epsilon amount than ε∗. Hence, the claim holds.
Step 4. Claim: Given consumers’ belief and strategy, when q(1 + p)log(2) ≤ 1, a
high type would choose strategy open.
If a high type deviates to ε∗, then consumers will not search. So Ggood(ε∗) = 2ε∗.
93
And as calculated in Step 1, Ggood(open) = 1. Ggood(open) ≥ Ggood(ε∗) if and only if
(q + qp)log(2) ≤ 1.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1. Claim: There does not exist an equilibrium where consumers do not
search.
If consumers do not search, then they donate g˜ where g˜ is the solution to g that
maximizes: w−g+(1+q)(1+p)log(g+ g˜). g˜ = 1
8
(1+q)(1+p). This gives an expected
payoff of w − 1
8
(1 + q)(1 + p) + 1
4
(1 + q)(1 + p)log( (1+q)(1+p)
4
).
If a consumer deviates to search, he fully learns the type and maximize utility
under each type. The ex ante expected payoff would be 1
4
(w−(1− (1+q)(1+p)
8
))+ 1
4
(w−
(p− (1+q)(1+p)
8
)+plog(p))+ 1
4
(w−max{q− (1+q)(1+p)
8
, 0}+qlog(max{q− (1+q)(1+p)
8
, 0}+
(1+q)(1+p)
8
))+ 1
4
(w−max{qp− (1+q)(1+p)
8
, 0}+qlog(max{qp− (1+q)(1+p)
8
, 0}+ (1+q)(1+p)
8
)),
which is higher than the expected payoff without deviation, for all q, p that satisfy the
conditions in Proposition 1. Therefore, there is no equilibrium where both consumers
do not search.
Step 2. Claim: There exists an equilibrium where consumers search.
If a consumer searches, he donates 1, if the charity is of high quality and match-
ing type, and donates q, if the charity is of low quality and matching type. If the
purpose of charity does not match the consumer’s interest, then he does not donate.
So the expected payoff from searching is w − 1
4
(1 + q) + 1
4
q(1 + p)log(q) − K. If
the consumer deviates to no search, then it can be shown that for search costs small
enough, deviation leads to a lower expected payoff, for all q, p that satisfy the con-
ditions in Proposition 1. Hence, consumers would not deviate, and both searching is
an equilibrium outcome.
94
Step 3. Claim: The equilibrium in Step 2 yields lower ex ante payoff than the
baseline separating equilibrium.
The expected payoff from the baseline equilibrium is−1
4
+1
4
q(1+p)log( q(1+p)
2
log(2))−
K
2
. So Expected Payoff (Baseline) − Expected Payoff (No Epsilon) is 1
4
q + 1
4
q(1 +
p)log(1+p
2
log(2)) + K
2
. Since q, p satisfy the conditions in Proposition 1, 1
4
q + 1
4
q(1 +
p)log(1+p
2
log(2)) ≥ 0. And since search cost is strictly positive, Expected Payoff
(Baseline) > Expected Payoff (No Epsilon).
In sum, the baseline equilibrium yields higher consumer welfare than the case
where epsilon is banned.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS IN CHAPTER 2
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B.1 Proof of Proposition 0
Let gi(di, dj) denote firm i
′s first order condition of maximization total profit
with respect to donation di given firm j
′s donation dj under symmetric information.
Specifically, gi(di, dj) =
2β
3
[ l
2
+ α
6
(ri − rj) + β6 (di − dj)]− kd(di, ri), i = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
Let di(dj, β) denote the solution of gi(di(dj,β), dj) = 0.
I first show that dSI1 > d
SI
2 . Combining g1(d
SI
1 , d
SI
2 ) = 0 and g2(d
SI
2 , d
SI
1 ) = 0, I
obtain 2β
9
α(r1 − r2) = kd(dSI1 , r1)− kd(dSI2 , r2)− 2β
2
9
(dSI1 − dSI2 ). Strict single crossing
property of k(d, r) implies that 2β
9
α(r1−r2) < kd(dSI1 , r2)−kd(dSI2 , r2)−2β
2
9
(dSI1 −dSI2 ) =∫ dSI1
dSI2
[kdd(x, r2) − 2β29 ]dx. Note that the steadiness of equilibrium under symmetric
information requires−∂g2(d2,d1)
∂d2
> −∂g1(d1,d2)
∂d2
, so kdd(d, r2)− β29 > β
2
9
. As 2β
9
α(r1−r2) >
0 and kdd(x, r2)− 2β29 > 0, it must be dSI1 > dSI2 .
Next, I show that
d(dSI1 +d
SI
2 )
dβ
> 0. g1(d
SI
1 , d
SI
2 ) = 0 and g2(d
SI
2 , d
SI
1 ) = 0 imply
that 2β
3
l = kd(d
SI
1 , r1) + kd(d
SI
2 , r2). Differentiating both sides with respect to β, I
obtain kdd(d
SI
1 , r1)
d(dSI1 )
dβ
+ kdd(d
SI
2 , r2)
d(dSI2 )
dβ
= 2
3
l > 0. As kdd(di, ri) > 0, it must
be
d(dSI1 )
dβ
> 0, or
d(dSI2 )
dβ
> 0, or both. Suppose
d(dSI2 )
dβ
> 0. Note that
d(dSI1 )
dβ
=
d(d1(dSI2 ,β))
dβ
=
∂(d1(dSI2 ,β))
∂dSI2
d(dSI2 )
dβ
+
∂(d1(dSI2 ,β))
∂dSI2
, so it is sufficient to show
∂(d1(dSI2 ,β))
∂dSI2
> −1
and
∂(d1(dSI2 ,β))
∂dSI2
> 0. Taking the partial derivative on both sides of g1(d
SI
1 , d
SI
2 ) = 0
with respect to dSI2 and β, I get
∂(d1(dSI2 ,β))
∂dSI2
= −β2
9
/(kdd(d1, r1) − β29 ) > −1 and
∂(d1(dSI2 ,β))
∂dSI2
= 2
3
[ l
2
+ α
6
(ri − rj) + β3 (dSI1 − dSI2 )]/(kdd(d1, r1) − β
2
9
) > 0. Therefore,
d(dSI1 +d
SI
2 )
dβ
> 0. Similar argument can be applied to the case in which
d(dSI1 )
dβ
> 0.
B.2 Proof of Claim 1
I prove the claim using contradiction. Suppose that d˜1 < d
SI
1 .
I continue to use the notation of gi(di, dj) as in the proof of claim 1. The goal
is to prove that g1(d˜1, d˜2) > 0. Since firm 1 is still considered as high type if it
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increases its donation, g1(d˜1, d˜2) > 0 indicates that firm 1 can increase its profit by
increasing donation under asymmetric information, which contradicts (d˜1, d˜2) being
an equilibrium.
Note that by the definition of gi, g1(d
SI
1 , d
SI
2 ) = 0. Thus, g1(d˜1, d˜2) > 0 is equiva-
lent to
∫ dSI1
d˜1
[kdd(d1, r1)− β29 ]dd1 >
∫ d˜2
dSI2
β2
9
dd2. Note that the steadiness of equilibrium
under symmetric information requires−∂g1(d1,d2)
∂d1
> −∂g2(d1,d2)
∂d1
, so kdd(d1, r1)−β29 > β
2
9
.
As dSI1 − d˜1¿0, a sufficient condition for g1(d˜1, d˜2) > 0 is dSI1 − d˜1 > d˜2 − dSI2 . As firm
2 is considered as low type for at least an interval around d˜2, it must be the case that
g2(d˜2, d˜1) = 0. Otherwise, d˜2 is not the optimal choice of firm 2 under asymmetric
information. Combining g2(d
SI
2 , d
SI
1 ) = 0 and g2(d˜2, d˜1) = 0, one can easily show
that
∫ dSI1
d˜1
β2
9
dd1 =
∫ d˜2
dSI2
[kdd(d2, r2) − β29 ]dd2, which implies dSI1 − d˜1 > d˜2 − dSI2 . This
completes the proof of g1(d˜1, d˜2) > 0 and results in contradiction.
B.3 Proof of Claim 2
I continue to use the notation of gi(di, dj) as in the proof of claim 1. By the argu-
ment in the proof above, g2(d
SI
2 , d
SI
1 ) = 0 and g2(d˜2, d˜1) = 0. Therefore,
∫ d˜1
dSI1
β2
9
dd1 =∫ dSI2
d˜2
[kdd(d2, r2) − β29 ]dd2. As d˜1 − dSI1 > 0 and kdd(d2, r2) − β
2
9
> β
2
9
, I obtain
d˜1 − dSI1 > dSI2 − d˜2, which is d˜1 + d˜2 > dSI1 + dSI2 . The equation also implies
dSI2 − d˜2 > 0 as d˜1 − dSI1 > 0 . Thus, d˜1 − dSI1 > 0 > d˜2 − dSI2 , which indicates
d˜1 − d˜2 > dSI1 − dSI2 .
B.4 Proof of Proposition 1
I first prove the existence of a separating equilibrium, and then show that (dAI1 , d
AI
2 )
characterized by conditions (1) and (2) is an equilibrium.
I continue to use the notation of gi(di, dj) and d2(d1) as in the proof of claim 1.
Note that dAI2 = d2(d
AI
1 ) by condition (2).
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Existence
For any d˜1 ≥ dSI1 , let Bdev2 (d˜1) denote firm 2’s benefit of deviating from d2(d˜1)
to d˜1 under asymmetric information. As firm 1 and firm 2 are considered as high
type and low type respectively under (d˜1, d2(d˜1)), firm 2’s profit is 2[
l
2
+ α
6
(r2 −
r1) +
β
6
(d2(d˜1) − d˜1)]2 − k(d2(d˜1), r2). If firm 2 deviates to d˜1, then both firms are
considered as high type, and firm 2’s profit becomes 2( l
2
)2 − k(d˜1, r2). 1 Thus,
Bdev2 (d˜1) = 2(
l
2
)2 − k(d˜1, r2) − 2[ l2 + α6 (r2 − r1) + β6 (d2(d˜1) − d˜1)]2 + k(d2(d˜1), r2).
Note that Bdev2 (d˜1) = 0 is condition (1) in the proposition, and it pins down d
AI
1 and
d2(d
AI
1 ).
A sufficient condition for separating equilibrium to exist is dBdev2 (d˜1)/d(d˜1) < 0.
If Bdev2 (d
SI
1 ) ≤ 0, then (dSI1 , dSI2 ) is a separating equilibrium. If Bdev2 (dSI1 ) > 0, then
dBdev2 (d˜1)/d(d˜1) < 0 indicates that there exists d˜1 such that B
dev
2 (d˜1) ≤ 0. Since
∂Bdev2 (d˜1)/∂d2 = g2(d2(d˜1), d˜1) = 0, I have dB
dev
2 (d˜1)/d(d˜1) = ∂B
dev
2 (d˜1)/∂d˜1 =
−kd(d˜1, r2) + 2β3 [ l2 − α6 (r1 − r2) − β6 (d˜1 − d2(d˜1))]. Using g1(dSI1 , dSI2 ) = 0 and notic-
ing that kdd > 0, d˜1 ≥ dSI1 , r1 ≥ r2 and d˜1 ≥ d2(d˜1), one can easily obtain that
dBdev2 (d˜1)/d(d˜1) < 0.
(dAI1 , d
AI
2 ) characterized by conditions (1) and (2) is an equilibrium
I prove that (dAI1 , d
AI
2 ) is an equilibrium by ruling out all possible deviations in
the following five cases.
(i) Firm 1 does not have incentive to deviate to dˆ1 > d
AI
1 .
If firm 1 deviates upwards, it is still considered as high type. Analogous to the
proof of claim 1, a sufficient condition for g1(dˆ1, d
AI
2 ) < 0 for any dˆ1 ≥ dAI1 is dˆ1−dSI2 >
1If firm 2 deviates to dˆ2 > d
AI
1 , it is considered as a high type firm based on consumer’s belief
function. In this case, both firms are considered as high type, or more generally both firms are
considered to have the same responsibility distribution. With regard to consumers’ choice between
firm 1 and firm 2, it does not matter whether consumers believe that both firms have high responsi-
bility (more consistent with the belief function), or that firm 1 has high responsibility and firm 2 has
low responsibility with 1/2 probability and the other way around for the remaining 1/2 probability
(more consistent with the model setup of one high responsibility firm and one low responsibility
firm).
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dSI2 − dAI2 . g2(dSI2 , dSI1 ) = 0 and g2(dAI2 , dAI1 ) = 0 together imply that dAI1 − dSI2 >
dSI2 − dAI2 . As dˆ1 > dAI1 , I obtain g1(dˆ1, dAI2 ) < 0, which indicates it is not beneficial
for firm 1 to deviate upwards.
(ii) Firm 2 does not have incentive to deviate to dˆ2 < d
AI
1 .
If firm 2 deviates to any dˆ2 < d
AI
1 , it is still considered as low type. Since d
AI
2 =
d2(d
AI
1 ) is firm 2’s optimal donation level given being a low type, it is not beneficial
for firm 2 to deviate to dˆ2 < d
AI
1 .
(iii) Firm 2 does not have incentive to deviate to dˆ2 = d
AI
1 .
By condition (1), firm 2 generates same profit under dAI2 and d
AI
1 , so it has no
incentive to deviate.
(iv) Firm 2 does not have incentive to deviate to dˆ2 > d
AI
1 .
Suppose firm 2 deviates to dˆ2 > d
AI
1 . Then firm 2 is considered as high type.
Since firm 2’s total profit under (dAI1 , d
AI
2 ) is same as its profit under (d
AI
1 , d
AI
1 ) by
condition (1), I only need to show that firm 2’s profit under (dAI1 , dˆ2) is lower than
its profit under (dAI1 , d
AI
1 ) to construct a contradiction. The idea is that if firm 1 as
a good firm has no incentive to donate more than dAI1 (as shown in (i)), firm 2 as a
bad firm should also have no incentive to do so. Mathematically, it is easy to show
that 2[ l
2
+ β
6
(dˆ2 − dAI1 )]2 − 2( l2)2 < 2[ l2 + α6 (r1 − r2) + β6 (dˆ2 − dAI2 )]2 − 2[ l2 + α6 (r1 −
r2) +
β
6
(dAI1 − dAI2 )]2, and the single crossing property of the cost function implies
k(dˆ2, r1) − k(dAI1 , r1) < k(dˆ2, r2) − k(dAI1 , r2). Also, (i) indicates that 2[ l2 + α6 (r1 −
r2) +
β
6
(dˆ2− dAI2 )]2− 2[ l2 + α6 (r1− r2) + β6 (dAI1 − dAI2 )]2 < k(dˆ2, r1)− k(dAI1 , r1). These
inequalities together imply that 2[ l
2
+ β
6
(dˆ2 − dAI1 )]2 − k(dˆ2, r2) < 2( l2)2 − k(dAI1 , r2),
so firm 2’s profit under (dAI1 , dˆ2) is lower than its profit under (d
AI
1 , d
AI
1 ). Thus, firm
2 has no incentive to deviate to dˆ2 > d
AI
1 .
(iv) Firm 1 does not have incentive to deviate to dˆ1 < d
AI
1 .
Suppose firm 1 deviates to dˆ1 < d
AI
1 . Then firm 1 is considered as low type. Let
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pi
dAI1
1 denote firm 1’s profit with no deviation. pi
dAI1
1 = 2[
l
2
+ α
6
(r1 − r2) + β6 (dAI1 −
dAI2 )]
2 − k(dAI1 , r1). Since firm 2’s benefit of deviating to dAI1 is zero by condition (1),
pi
dAI1
1 = 2[
l
2
+ α
6
(r1− r2) + β6 (dAI1 − dAI2 )]2− 2( l2)2 + 2[ l2 − α6 (r1− r2) + β6 (dAI1 − dAI2 )]2 +
k(dAI1 , r2)− k(dAI2 , r2)− k(dAI1 , r1). The single crossing property of the cost function
implies k(dAI1 r2)−k(dAI1 , r1) > k(dˆ1, r2)−k(dˆ1, r1). So pid
AI
1
1 > 2[
l
2
+ α
6
(r1−r2)+ β6 (dAI1 −
dAI2 )]
2−2( l
2
)2 +2[ l
2
− α
6
(r1−r2)+ β6 (dAI1 −dAI2 )]2 +k(dˆ1, r2)−k(dˆ1, r1)−k(dAI2 , r2). As
dAI2 is firm 2’s optimal donation level under d2 < d
AI
1 given firm 1’s donation d
AI
1 , 2[
l
2
−
α
6
(r1−r2)+ β6 (dAI1 −dAI2 )]2−k(dAI2 , r2) > 2[ l2− α6 (r1−r2)− β6 (dAI1 − dˆ1)]2−k(dˆ1, r2). So
pi
dAI1
1 > 2[
l
2
+α
6
(r1−r2)+β6 (dAI1 −dAI2 )]2−2( l2)2+2[ l2−α6 (r1−r2)−β6 (dAI1 −dˆ1)]2−k(dˆ1, r1).
It can be easily shown that 2[ l
2
+α
6
(r1−r2)+β6 (dAI1 −dAI2 )]2−2( l2)2 > 2[ l2+β6 (dˆ1−dAI2 )]2−
2[ l
2
− α
6
(r1− r2)− β6 (dAI1 − dˆ1)]2. Therefore, pi
dAI1
1 > 2[
l
2
+ β
6
(dˆ1− dAI2 )]2− k(dˆ1, r1). As
the right-hand-side of the inequality is firm 1’s profit with deviation dˆ1, the inequality
indicates that firm 1 does not have incentive to deviate downwards.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Since dAI1 + d
AI
2 > d
SI
1 + d
SI
2 , it is sufficient to show that C
AI + ΠAI > CSI + ΠSI .
For both symmetric and asymmetric information cases, C + Π = c1 + c2 + pi1 +
pi2, where ci denotes consumers’ utility from purchasing goods from firm i, and pii
denotes firm i′s total profit. Let x∗denote the consumer who is just indifferent between
purchasing from firm 1 or firm 2. Then, pi1 +pi2 = x
∗(p1− c)−k(d1, r1)+(l−x∗)(p2−
c)−k(d2, r2), and c1 +c2 =
∫ x∗
0
[−x−p1 +αr1 +β(d1−d2)]dx+
∫ l−x∗
0
[−x−p2 +αr2]dx.
After simplifications, C + Π can be written as −1
2
(x∗)2 − 1
2
(l − x∗)2 + [α(r1 − r2) +
β(d1 − d2)]x∗ − k(d1, r1)− k(d2, r2) + l(αr2 − c).
Since dAI2 < d
SI
2 , a sufficient condition for C
AI + ΠAI > CSI + ΠSI is −1
2
(xAI)2 −
1
2
(l − xAI)2 + [α(r1 − r2) + β(dAI1 − dAI2 )]xAI − k(dAI1 , r1) > −12(xSI)2 − 12(l − xSI)2 +
[α(r1− r2)+β(dSI1 −dSI2 )]xSI−k(dSI1 , r1), where xAI = 12 l+ β6 (dAI1 −dAI2 )+ α6 (r1− r2),
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and xSI = 1
2
l + β
6
(dSI1 − dSI2 ) + α6 (r1 − r2). Note that (dAI1 , dAI2 ) is a separating
equilibrium, so firm 1’s profit is higher under (dAI1 , d
AI
2 ) than under (d
SI
1 , d
AI
2 ). Thus,
2(xAI)2 − k(dAI1 , r1) > 2[ l2 + β6 (dSI1 − dAI2 )]2 − k(dSI1 , r1) > 2[ l2 + β6 (dSI1 − dSI2 )]2 −
k(dSI1 , r1). Using this equality, the sufficient condition for the proposition becomes
2(xAI)2−2[ l
2
+ β
6
(dSI1 −dSI2 )]2 < 12(xSI)2 + 12(l−xSI)2− 12(xAI)2− 12(l−xAI)2 +[α(r1−
r2) + β(d
AI
1 − dAI2 )]xAI − [α(r1 − r2) + β(dSI1 − dSI2 )]xSI .
The LHS of the above inequality can be simplified to [(dAI1 −dAI2 )−(dSI1 −dSI2 )][13 lβ+
1
18
αβ(r1 − r2) + 118β2(dSI1 − dSI2 + dAI1 − dAI2 )], and the RHS can be simplified to
[(dAI1 − dAI2 )− (dSI1 − dSI2 )][12 lβ + 518αβ(r1− r2) + 536β2(dSI1 − dSI2 + dAI1 − dAI2 )]. Thus,
the inequality holds. This completes the proof of proposition 2.
B.6 Welfare Calculation
I show how total social welfare is calculated under social planner’s problem, sym-
metric information, and asymmetric information. These calculations are used in the
numerical example.
Social Planner’s Problem
Social planner maximizes total welfare C + W − G + Nαlog(G + d1 + d2) + Π
by choosing p1, p2, d1, d2 and G. Based on the proof of Proposition 2, C + Π =
−1
2
(x∗)2 − 1
2
(l − x∗)2 + [(r1 − r2) + β(d1 − d2)]x∗ − k(d1, r1) − k(d2, r2) + l(αr2 − c),
where x∗ = 1
2
l− 1
2
(p1 − p2) + α2 (r1 − r2) + β2 (d1 − d2). Here, I suppose d1 ≥ d2. Later
I will show that d1 < d2 cannot be socially optimal. I solve the problem by first
finding the optimal choice of p1, p2 for any given d1, d2 and G, and then solve the
full maximization problem. Since p1, p2 is one-to-one determined by x
∗, finding the
optimal p1, p2 is equivalent to finding the optimal x
∗. One can easily show that social
planner’s optimal x∗ is 1
2
l + α
2
(r1 − r2) + β2 (d1 − d2), and the objective function can
written as [1
2
l+ α
2
(r1− r2) + β2 (d1− d2)]2− 12 l2− lc+ lαr2− k(d1, r1)− k(d2, r2)−G+
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Nαlog(G+ d1 + d2). d
SP
1 , d
SP
2 is either pinned down by the FOC of d1, d2 if d
SP
2 > 0,
or dSP1 is the solution to its FOC and d
SP
2 = 0. G
SP = Nα− dSP1 − dSP2 .
If social planner chooses d1 < d2, the objective becomes [
1
2
l− α
2
(r1 − r2) + β2 (d2 −
d1)]
2− 1
2
l2− lc+ lαr1− k(d1, r1)− k(d2, r2)−G+Nαlog(G+ d1 + d2), which can be
shown to be smaller than [1
2
l+ α
2
(r1− r2) + β2 (d2− d1)]2− 12 l2− lc+ lαr2− k(d1, r1)−
k(d2, r2)−G+Nαlog(G+ d1 + d2) for any given d1, d2 and G. This means that for
any choice of d1 < d2, social planner can increase welfare by making firm 1 donate
the higher amount d2 and firm 2 denote d1. Thus, d1 < d2 cannot be socially optimal.
Symmetric Information
Firms’ choice of donation dSI1 and d
SI
2 under symmetric information is solved by
g1(d
SI
1 , d
SI
2 ) = 0 and g2(d
SI
2 , d
SI
1 ) = 0. For each individual consumer i, the optimal
choice of gi = max{0, (α− dSI1 − dSI2 )/N}.
Asymmetric Information
Firms’ choice of donation dAI1 and d
AI
2 under asymmetric information depends on
whether (dSI1 , d
SI
2 ) can be supported as a separating equilibrium. If ∆r is small enough
such that firm 2 does not have incentive to mimic firm 1’s donation at dSI1 (see proof
of Proposition 1 for the calculation of deviation benefit), then (dAI1 , d
AI
2 ) = (d
SI
1 , d
SI
2 ).
Otherwise, (dAI1 , d
AI
2 ) is solved by conditions (1) and (2) in Proposition (1). For each
individual consumer i, the optimal choice of gi = max{0, (α− dAI1 − dAI2 )/N}.
B.7 Personal Consumption Percentage
I describe in details how to use the benchmark input-output (IO) matrix from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis to calculate personal consumption percentage. The
procedures follow Becker and Thomas (2008) and Ahern and Harford (2014).
IO matrix provides the summary of producing and purchasing activities in U.S.
based on data from the Economic Census. It is consisted of a make table and a use
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table. The make table is an industry by commodity matrix which gives the value in
each commodity produced by each industry based on producer prices. The use table
is a commodity by industry matrix which gives the value in each commodity used by
each industry or final consumer (personal consumption, government) also based on
producer prices. The link between the make table and the use table is commodity.
To measure personal consumption percentage of each industry, I start with the
make table and calculate the market share of each commodity c that industry i
produces. Industry i′s market share of commodity c is sharei,c = makei,c/
∑
k
makek,c,
where makek,c is the value of commodity c produced by industry k from the make
table. I then use the use table to calculate the total revenue that producer industry
i generated from each user industry j (including final consumer). For industry i, the
revenue from industry j is revi,j =
∑
c
sharei,c × usec,j, where usec,j is the value of
commodity c used by industry j from the use table. Next, I calculate the percentage
of industry i′s revenue from industry j as rev pcti,j = revi,j/
∑
i
makei,c. Finally,
the personal consumption percentage of industry i is defined as rev pcti,j where j is
personal consumption, which takes the value of F01000.
The industry defined in IO matrix is based on BEA’s industry classification. BEA
defines industries at two levels of aggregation, detailed and summary. I use detailed
classification to calculate PCP for each industry. To convert BEA’s industry to 6-
digit NAICS, I use the concordance tables reported with the IO tables. For NAICS
industries that have multiple corresponding BEA detailed industries, I calculate the
PCP as the weighted average of PCP of corresponding BEA industries where the
industry total output is used as weights.
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